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—. ...wwiuic, according to tiie facts of this case, the contribution and payments of plaintiff; (2) quiet title;
very intent relied upon by the majority is not and (3) accommodation. In addition to asking the
supported, and child kidnaping would merge into court for an order quieting title in his name, Lee
requested an order
aggravated sexual abuse of a child.
<[73
I would remand for sentencing upon the
dissolving the partnership of the parties [sic],
aggravated sexual abuse of a child conviction.
. . . and an accounting and determination of
all partnership proceeds and contributions,
and . . . an order determining the relative
James Z. Davis, Judge
equitable value of each parties contribution to
the investment property, which [Lee] believes
1. Diaz challenges the March 25, 1999 sentencing hearing,
should be a finding of 100% interest in the
the merger analysis, and his sentence, specifically the
property to [Lee] and 0% to [Sanders].
prosecutor's post-merger role in deciding upon which crime
Diaz would be sentenced and the related decision not to Sanders filed an answer, and, on June 6, 2000, after
sentence on aggravated sexual abuse of a child.
sufficient time had passed to permit the Parties an
2. Because I believe both kidnaping charges merged into the opportunity to conduct discovery, a trial was held.
host crime, I do not here address the propriety of dealing <I4 Following the trial, the court issued a
with an inconsistent verdict where the inconsistency was memorandum decision wherein the court found, inter
arguably eliminated as a matter of law.
alia, that the Parties had purchased and recorded the
3. The specific intent element has since been removed from
the statute. See Utah Code Ann. §76-5-301.1 (Supp. 2001). property as joint tenants. The court also determined
that "based upon principles of equity and partnership,
the Parties, though unmarried[,] should share equally
in the amount of equity found by the court." The court
Cite as
then proceeded to determine that equity was best
455 Utah Adv. Rep. 59
determined by examining the change in the amount
owed on the mortgage over the time that the Parties
IN THE
jointly occupied the property. The trial court then
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
determined that the amount owed on the property had
decreased $1160.97 during the period in question,
Dan F. LEE,
awarded Sanders one-half of that amount, and quieted
Plaintiff and Appellee,
title in Lee's name.
?5 Sanders subsequently filed a Motion to Amend
Dora SANDERS aka Dora Branin, and John Does the Judgment arguing that the trial court used an
MO,
incorrect method to determine equity, and asserting
Defendants and Appellants.
that because neither party had asked the trial court to
determine the equity vested in the property, and
[No. 20000945-CA
because neither party had presented any evidence of
FILED: 09/06/02
the value of the property, the court had erred in
2002 UTApp 281
making its equity determination. The trial court
denied the motion, concluding that while "neither
Fourth District, Provo Department
party [had] presented evidence of the property's actual
The Honorable Gary D. Stott
or appraised value at trial," both Parties "put at issue
the value of the real property at issue in the lawsuit."
ATTORNEYS:
Sanders now appeals.
Howard Chuntz, Orem, for Appellants
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Ralph C. Amott, Provo, for Appellee
16 Sanders argues that the trial court's decision to
determine the amount of equity vested in the property
Before Judges Bench. Davis, and Thorne.
was improper because the issue of equity was neither
pleaded nor argued by the Parties. Whether an issue
This opinion is subject to revision before
was properly before the trial court presents a question
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
of law, which we review for correctness. See Keller v.
Southwood N. Med. Pavilion, 959 P.2d 102, 105
?THORNE, Judge:
(Utah 1998); Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns,
J l Dora Sanders appeals from the trial court's order Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1984).
determining her money interest in a partnership
ANALYSIS
>perty. We reverse and remand.
TJ Sanders argues that because the property equity
W
BACKGROUND
issue was neither pleaded nor tried by consent, the
B2 In 1994, Sanders and Dan Lee jointly purchased trial court erred in determining the equity amount. A
Kroperty in American Fork, Utah. The couple resided trial court's findings should fit "within the framework
Ira the property and shared expenses through of the petition as originally drawn, or as amended"
Btovember 1996 when Sanders moved. From that time and should be supported by the evidence presented. In
lorward, Lee assumed all responsibility for the costs re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657, 663
Bssociated with the property, including the mortgage, (1950). Under rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil
insurance, taxes, and maintenance costs.
Procedure, a trial court may infer an amendment to
H3 In October 1999, after attempting to refinance or the pleadings if the issue is tried by the Parties'
pell the property and learning that Sanders was still a
express or implied consent. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b).
Kamed title holder, Lee filed suit against Sanders in an
"Implied consent to try an issue may be found where
Kttcmpt to quiet title, Lee's complaint listed three
one party raises an issue material to the other party's
jfeiuses of action: (1) equitable dissolution and
case or where evidence is introduced without
Pvision of partnership property and/or judgment for
objection, [and] where it appear[s] that the parties
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understood the evidence [was] to be aimed at the
unpleaded issue." Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782,
785 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (second and third
alterations in original) (citations and quotations
omitted). "A trial court may not base its decision on
an issue that was tried inadvertently." Archuleta v.
Hughes, 969 P.2d 409, 413 (Utah 1998) (citations
and quotations omitted); see also Combe, 680 P.2d at
736 (holding that a "court may not grant judgment for
relief which is neither requested by the pleadings nor
within the theory on which the case was tried").
18 In the instant case, in its ruling denying Sanders's
motion to amend the judgment, the trial court
concluded that while "neither party [had] presented
evidence of the property's actual or appraised value at
trial," both Parties "put at issue the value of the real
property at issue in the lawsuit." We disagree.
19 In his complaint, Lee asked the trial court to
determine, inter alia, "the relative equitable value of
each parties [sic] contribution to the investment
property." Lee also asked the court for "an accounting
and determination of all partnership proceeds."
However, the thrust of Lee's prayer for relief is found
in his request for a determination that he possessed
sole interest in the property, thus entitling him to an
order quieting title in his name. We have thoroughly
reviewed both the complaint and the answer and can
nowhere find any language that would empower the
trial court to determine the actual value of the
property or to reduce the Parties' relative interests to
a money amount. We therefore conclude that the trial
court erred in determining that value had been put at
issue in the pleadings.1
110
Moreover, while it is true that a trial court
may infer an amendment to the pleadings when the
Parties try an issue by express or implied consent, "[a]
trial court may not base its decision on an issue that
was tried inadvertently." Archuleta, 969 P.2d at 413
(citations and quotations omitted). Here, we have
reviewed the trial record and, absent Sanders's
unsuccessful attempt to introduce an appraisal of the
property into evidence, there is nothing to suggest that
the Parties ever presented the issue of Property value
to the trial court. Accordingly, to the extent mat the
trial court may have relied either upon evidence
submitted by the Parties, or trial testimony, to support
its decision, the trial court erred in deciding the issue
of the property's value.
111
Finally, even assuming that the issue of the
Parties' relative equity interests was properly before
the court, we can see nothing in the record to support
the trial court's adoption of any figure, let alone the
figure actually adopted by the trial court. "The term
'equity' is described as the money value of a property
or of an interest in property in excess of claims or
liens against it. . . . It is the value in excess of [the]
mortgage or other liens." Land v. Land, 605 P.2d
1248, 1251 (Utah 1980) (footnotes omitted). Here,
after hearing all of the testimony and examining all of
the evidence, the trial court found
that per exhibit 23 the purchase price of the
property was $51,296.75 as of September 14,
1994. The Court also finds that from exhibit
16, as of October 31, 1996, the time of
separation of the Parties, $50,135[.]78 was
due and owing on the property. Subtracting
that amount from the original price, the Court
finds that the equity established in the
property by the evidence is $ 1,160.97.

Provo, Utah

Considering the evidence, the court finds that
based upon principles of equity and
partnership, the Parties, though unmarried
should divide equally the amount of equity
found by the Court.
112
As previously discussed, neither party
successfully introduced evidence of the property value
through either an appraisal or an expert opinion. In
fact, as evidenced by the trial court's decision, the
only information concerning the "value" of the
property focused on the price the Parties paid for the
property in 1994 and the amount owing at the time the
Parties separated. In a time of fluctuating property
values, real estate equity cannot be determined simply
through the examination of changes in mortgage
principal over time, as the trial court has done here.
Therefore, had the trial court been properly presented
with the issue of relative equity interests, its equity
determination was improper.
113
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's
decision to determine the Parties' relative monetary
interests in the property and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this decision.
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
114

I CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge

1. The trial court's ruling seems to suggest that both Parties
placed the value of the property at issue. However, Sanders
filed only a responsive pleading, i.e., an answer. Through
this document, Sanders asked only that the trial court order
the property sold and the resulting equity divided equally
between the Parties. This request lends no support to the trial
court's conclusion.
DAVIS, Judge (dissenting):
115
I believe the trial court did not err in
determining the equity value of the property. Because
the equity of the home was an issue from the
beginning, the parties had adequate notice that it
would be part of the litigation. See Berger v. Berger,
713 P.2d 695, 699 (Utah 1985) (holding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion where value was an
issue at trial and the court's valuation was based upon
evidence presented and a suggested valuation
method). In fact, Sanders made an attempt to present
documentary market valuation evidence, which the
trial court, in response to Lee's objection, deemed
inadmissible hearsay. Sanders also attempted to testify
regarding an appraisal performed in 1997; however,
in response to a similar objection, the testimony was
not allowed. Thereafter, Sanders made no further
attempts to produce or present any additional
evidence.1 Clearly, the issue was before the court and
Sanders cannot now argue that it was an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to have reached the issue.
116
Further, it is not an abuse of discretion for a
trial court to base its valuation of property solely on
evidence presented by one party where the other party
failed to provide contrary evidence. See Elman v.
Elman, 2002 UT App 83,132, 45 P.3d 176; see also
Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 470-71 (Utah 1984)
(holding that the party objecting to the valuation
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method has the burden of offering further evidence). the partnership agreement, Buchi and Parduhn again
"Having failed to produce such evidence, [Sanders] increased the insurance coverage on each other's lives
may not claim that the trial court erred in considering to $300,000 and $250,000 respectively. The $300,000
the information [supplied]." Argyle, 688 P.2d at 470. policy on Buchi's life named Parduhn as the
117
I would therefore affirm the trial court and beneficiary and "buy/sell partner" as the purpose for
find that the issue of valuation was clearly before the the policy.
trial court and that the trial court did not err in 13 Buchi and Parduhn operated their business for
determining the equity value based upon the evidence eighteen years. Early in 1997, they contracted to sell
their business and service stations to Blackett Oil
presented.
Company. They closed their deal on July 14, 1997,
transferred the business assets to Blackett, and ceased
James Z. Davis, Judge
to do business. Buchi died on August 7, 1997. On
November 6, 1997, Parduhn filed an action to
ill. The evidence admitted included the original mortgage establish his right to the proceeds of the insurance
balance, the mortgage balance at the time of separation, and policy on Buchi's life. Buchi's wife and children
?a 1999 County Property Tax Valuation that was not relevant argued that they should receive the proceeds under the
buy-sell agreement. Parduhn filed a motion for
'because of the time period it represented.
summary judgment, which the trial court denied on
the grounds that there were genuine issues of material
fact.
Cite as
^4 In its August 27, 2001 Memorandum Decision,
455 Utah Adv. Rep. 61
the trial court awarded the insurance proceeds to
Buchi's survivors, determining that the buy-sell
IN THE SUPREME COURT
agreement remained effective after the business and
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
its assets were sold, that the insurance policy's
designation of Parduhn as the beneficiary was
Glade Leon PARDUHN,
ambiguous, and that "Buchi intended that [Parduhn]
Plaintiff and Appellant,
not be the actual beneficiary but the beneficiary only
v.
Natalie Buchi BENNETT, Allison Buchi, to pass on the proceeds to Buchi's survivors." Parduhn
Annabelle Buchi, Lance Buchi and Jessica Buchi appeals both the trial court's denial of his motion for
summary judgment and its Memorandum Decision.
(the "Buchi Children" and Joanne Buchi,
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Defendants and Appellees.
15 Parduhn challenges the trial court's denial of his
motion for summary judgment. "We review the trial
No. 20010811
court's grant or denial of a motion for summary
[No. 20010926
judgment for correctness and accord no deference to
FILED: 09/06/02
the trial court's conclusions of law." Malibu Inv.
2002 UT 93
Corp. v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30,112, 996 P.2d 1043.
Parduhn also challenges the trial court's conclusion
miird District, Salt Lake County
that the insurance contract was ambiguous. "Whether
phe Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck
a contract term is ambiguous is a question of law,
|The Honorable Anne M. Stirba
which we review for correctness." Sharon Steel v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur., 931 P.2d 127, 134 (Utah 1997).
ATTORNEYS:
16 Finally, Parduhn challenges the trial court's
E',: P. Bryan Fishburn, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
1^ Martin S. Tanner, Susan Black Dunn, Tim Dalton conclusion that the buy-sell agreement was effective
at the time of Buchi's death. "[W]hether a contract
Dunn, Salt Lake City, for defendants
exists between parties is a question of law which we
review for correctness." John Deere Co. v. A &. H
m
Equip., 876 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
m^This opinion is subject to revision before final
ANALYSIS
E>
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
17 The insurance policy unambiguously designates
JACKSON, Judge:
Parduhn as the beneficiary. Thus, we reverse the trial
Ifc
BACKGROUND
| k On May 23, 1979, Brad Buchi and Glade court's determination that the insurance policy's
;duhn agreed to form an equal partnership under designation of Parduhn as the beneficiary was
name University Texaco Company and to conduct ambiguous. Accordingly, the key issue remaining is
Rservice station business. The partners added a whether the buy-sell agreement remained in effect
fey-sell agreement to the partnership agreement, after the partners sold the partnership • business
Hjnich provided that "in the event of death of either" because the trial court's ultimate conclusion hinges on
Ktner, the survivor would purchase the decedent's this question. Because Parduhn directly challenges the
ffiferest in the "business" and "do with the business as trial court's conclusion that the buy-sell agreement
sees fit." They also agreed that the buy-out would remained effective, only after we review this ruling
funded by the proceeds of life insurance policies can we examine the parties' respective rights to the
each other's lives, the premiums of which would be proceeds of the insurance policy.
18 The trial court ruled that "because it was still in
jd by the partnership.
On January 25, 1984, Buchi and Parduhn effect at Buchi's death, the buy-sell agreement, if it
1
nded their partnership agreement to increase the existed, was still in effect." We hold that the trial
[
ount of the insurance coverage from $20,000 to court erred in this conclusion because Buchi and
'100,000, and purchased life insurance coverage lor Parduhn contracted to sell and sold the major assets
SLamount. On January 4, 1989, without amending and "the business" to Blackett Oil Company. Thus
UTAH ADVANCE R E P O R T S
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes or rules determinative of or
pertinent to the issues presented for review is contained in the body of this Reply Brief,
Doms' opening Brief, or the Addenda.
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS9 STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Several inaccurate statements are made in Plaintiffs' Statement of the Case. Plaintiffs
state that "the Statement of Facts in Doms' Brief contains a number of factual inaccuracies;"
however, such statement is in error and Doms maintains that all Statements of Fact in his
Opening Brief are supported by the record and prior decisions of this Court as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs argue "Doms states that Plaintiffs received a $82,500.00 payment on

the purchase price but does not indicate the source of these payments." This is not an
inaccurate statement by Doms. The trial court concluded, and the Utah Court of Appeals
decision in Anderson v. Doms^ 1999 UT App. 207, 984 P.2d 392, (hereafter cited as
Anderson II) (See Addendum 1) specifically found that "Doms is entitled to a refund of
monies paid as one of the original buyers of the properly, and as the successor in interest to
McCoy and DomCoy." Anderson II at^[21 n.12. Therefore, this Court has previously ruled
that the source of the monies paid is immaterial and Doms is entitled to a refund of all
monies paid. Thus, this statement in Doms' Opening Brief is not inaccurate and the
distinction made by Plaintiffs is immaterial based upon the law of the case doctrine. (See
Appellant's Opening Brief, Point II).
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2.

Plaintiffs also argue that "in paragraphs f and g, Doms indicates monthly

payments . . . were made but does not indicate the source of these payments." This statement
by Doms in the Statement of Facts is indeed specifically accurate, and the source of the
payments is immaterial to this Court's review based upon the same argument made in the
preceding paragraph.
3.

Plaintiffs also argue that "there is no evidence in the record as to who paid the

delinquent taxes, penalties and interest...." Again, the trial court concluded as a matter of
law, and this Court ultimately upheld that ruling, that "Doms is entitled to a refund of monies
paid as one of the original buyers of the property, and as the successor in interest to McCoy
and DomCoy" Anderson II at \ 21 n. 12. Plaintiffs' distinction is made immaterial by the
law of the case as argued in Doms' Opening Brief, Point II.
4.

Plaintiffs also claim as inaccurate Doms' statement in paragraph n of his

Statement of Facts in his Opening Brief that, on remand, the trial court found that the
conveyance of the property from Summit County to Doms after the tax sale resulted in Doms
holding "clear title to the property." Doms cited the lower court's Amended Judgment (R.
6692) and this was indeed the holding of the trial court. This Court looked at that precise
holding of the trial court in Anderson II and held: "On remand, the trial court found that the
conveyance of the property from Summit County to Doms after the tax sale resulted in Doms
holding cclear title to the property'. Therefore, Plaintiffs' arguments premised on the
contention that Doms did not hold title to the entire parcel are without merit." Anderson II
at ^[4 n.3 (emphasis added). Therefore, once again, the trial court and this Court have
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definitively decided the issue, and the allegation that Doms' statement was "factually
inaccurate" is simply false.
5.

Plaintiffs also claim that Doms was inaccurate in his Statement of Facts when

he stated "Doms is entitled to a refund of monies paid as one of the original buyers of the
propeity and as a successor-in-interest to McCoy and DomCoy" by claiming that there was
no evidence presented that Doms was a successor-in-interest to Mr. McCoy. Plaintiffs'
statement is in itself false, as the statement made by Doms which is challenged by Plaintiffs
is a direct quote from this Court. Anderson II at ^[21 n. 12. Again, that issue has been
definitively decided by both the trial court and this Court; and the challenged statement made
by Doms in the Statement of Facts is entirely accurate.
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since none of the Statement of Facts in Doms' Opening Brief other than those
previously addressed was challenged by Plaintiffs in their Responsive Brief, it may be
presumed that they have no objection to the remainder of the Statement of Facts. Plaintiffs
do however, attempt to add additional facts which are completely irrelevant and immaterial
to this Court's determination of the present appeal. These additional facts relate to Plaintiffs'
challenge of the earlier Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the trial court and/or this
Court's opinion in Anderson II.
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ARGUMENT
THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE BARS MOST OF PLAINTIFFS'
ARGUMENTS, AND ALL OF PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENTS ARE WITHOUT
MERIT,
The law of the case doctrine outright prohibits most of Plaintiffs' arguments. As the
Utah Supreme Court held in Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 2001 UT 75, 31 P.3d 543,
"Under the law of the case doctrine, issues resolved by this court on appeal bind the trial
court on remand and generally bind this court should the case return on appeal after remand."
Id. at %9. This doctrine is intended to promote "the obedience of inferior courts" and "to
avoid the delays and difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and reconsideration of
rulings on matters previously decided in the same case." Id.
Only under three "exceptional circumstances," where the intentions underlying the
doctrine are outweighed by "the greater interest in preventing unjust results or unwise
precedent," will the law of the case doctrine be abandoned:
(1)
(2)
(3)

when there has been an intervening change of controlling authority;
when new evidence has become available; or
when the court is convinced that its prior decision was clearly
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.

Id (relying on Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1995)).
In their Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Plaintiffs argue (1) that Doms is not
entitled to the return of interest paid under the Trust Deed Note; (2) that rescission is
inappropriate; (3) that even if rescission was appropriate, the trial court should have
determined the rights and responsibilities of each individual plaintiff; (4) that they should
have been awarded rent; (5) that the trial court should not have refunded taxes; and (6) that
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the trial court should not have awarded prejudgment mteiest With the exception only of (4)
and (6), all of these arguments are barred by the law of the case doctrine because they have
already been adjudicated by this Court, and Plaintiffs have not claimed that an "exceptional
cucumstance" applies to this case Nevertheless, as the following discussion indicates, none
of Plaintiffs' six aiguments has any merit
(1)

Plaintiffs cannot argue that Doms is not entitled to the return of interest
paid under the Trust Deed Note; even so, Doms is entitled to the return of
this interest.

This Court has already ordered the letum of mteiest paid undei the Trust Deed Note,
and theiefoie it is the law of the case In his Opening Brief, Doms made the specific point
that the trial court erred by failing to implement the final decision of this Court dated June
24, 1999 in this case Doms argued that this Court specifically stated m Anderson II at ^[21
(Add 1), "We therefore remand this issue to the trial court foi a determination and award to
Doms of the net payments paid by him less rental value plus interest " Doms pointed out that
the tiial court refused to award him some $72,520 00 in payments made on the contract plus
mteiest as oidered by this Court
In response, Plaintiffs ignore the law of the case and argue that the tiial court was
correct to rule that Doms is not entitled to the letura of interest paid undei the Trust Deed
Note because the interest was paid for Doms' and McCoy's use of Plaintiffs' money While
admitting that no Utah case has directly addressed this aspect of the issue, Plaintiffs cite
Libassi v Chelli, 615 N Y S 2d 75, 76 (N Y App Div 1994), wheie theie was a leversal
of an awaid of interest to the buyeis in a case involving lescission However, Plaintiffs fail
to tell this Court that m Libassi, the buyers had fiaudulently induced the selleis to sell the
5

pioperty

It was the sellers who later sought lescission, and the court declined to award

mteiest to the buyers because the buyers didn't have clean hands Plaintiffs' Brief ignores
the fact that in that case it was the buyer who acted in bad faith In the instant case, it is the
buyei Poms who seeks rescission and there is no Finding of Fact 01 Conclusion of Law by
the lower court, and certainly none in the 1999 opinion of this Court, that suggests that Poms
was responsible foi fiaud 01 had unclean hands Therefoie, the Lihassi case is clearly not
on point and should have no impact on this Court's previous holding that Poms should
teceive all cnet payments paid by him less lental value plus interest "
(a)

Plaintiffs' argument fheie and latei) that interest should be applied as a
"setoff to fair rental value fails because the tiial court found that no fair lental
value exists in this case

Plaintiffs cite Bechard v Bolton, 24 N W 2d 422, 423 (Mich 1946), for the
pioposition that inteiest should be used to offset rental value Howevei, Plaintiffs neglect
to tell this Court that the Bechard court specifically found that "inteiest and taxes paid by
the buyer equaled the reasonable rental value of the property " Id at 423 (emphasis added)
Furthermore, it awarded rental value only because the buyeis "had the light of possession
to the pioperty from the date of the contract and have used it to a consideiable extent " Id
(emphasis added) It follows that the outcome in Bechard would likely have been different
and interest and taxes awarded upon lescission had the buyeis not used the property at
all—especially if (as is true in the instant case) the property involved was law ground and
the only use the buyei had for the pioperty had been blocked by the title defect
In the instant case the trial court found that the pioperty had no rental value As it
mled in Finding of Fact No 5 of its "Modified Judgment" (attached as Add 4)
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The Court of Appeals has directed this Court to reduce the Judgment by fair
rental value; however the Court finds that the record is completely devoid of
any basis for rental value for this raw ground which had never been used in
any way by Defendant Poms. Therefore the Court declines to reduce the
Judgment in this case by any rental value, finding there is no fair rental value
to be placed upon the property.
(R. 8951 (emphasis added).) While Plaintiffs' attempt to convince this Court in Point IV of
their Responsive Brief that the trial court committed error when it refused to aweird Plaintiffs
a fair rental value, no citation to the record whatsoever is made to suggest that any evidence
was ever presented in the original trial or in the hearing on remand suggesting that Doms
made any use of the property whatsoever so as to trigger some finding that a fair rental value
was appropriate. Furthermore, as the trial court found, the evidence in this case was replete
with the idea that Doms had never used the property at all, because he learned that the
encroachments and easements were valid and had been perfected on the property, thus
preventing development. See Second Amended Findings of Fact nos. 26-30 and Conclusions
of Law 2-5 and 11-19 (Add. 2). Therefore, the Bechard case simply does not apply, as the
failure to award interest was based upon a setoff against fair rental value in that case.
Plaintiffs also cite Larsen v. Poller, 571 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991), as a
case where an appellate court upheld a lower court's decision to allow sellers to keep all
prior mortgage payments as fair rental value. In that case, as in Bechard, the buyer had
initiated repairs on the property at the time of rescission and therefore was found to have
been occupying and using the property, unlike the situation in the instant case where the
property lay completely dormant. As the Court stated in Larsen, cTn our view, given
plaintiffs initiation of needed repairs to the property, County Court properly exercised its
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equitable powers to effectuate that result [i.e. the intended result of rescission, which is to
put the parties back in the same position as before] by rescinding the note and mortgage but
allowing defendants to keep all prior mortgage payments as fair market rental value, and
denying plaintiffs claims for surveyor's and counsel fees." Id. at 123. It should be noted
that the Court was not, in this statement, looking at any value the repairs might have added
to the property; otherwise the Court would have awarded something to the buyers. Instead,
what seems to be important about the "initiation of needed repairs" is that it showed that the
property was being used by the buyers; thus, the Court awarded fair rental value to
defendants and refused plaintiffs request for other costs and fees.
Finally, Plaintiffs cite Ohio Valley Trust Co. v. Allison, 89 A. 1132, 1134 (Pa. 1914),
for the proposition that money received as interest paid on the balance of the purchase price
should not be returned in a rescission action. Besides the fact that this is a Pennsylvania
decision from 1914, Plaintiffs seem not to have read the case carefully, since it affirmed the
trial court's denial of a deduction "for the [buyer's] use of the propeity." The court there
found "no evidence was offered to show what such use would have been worth." Id. at 1134.
In the instant case, Plaintiffs have never offered evidence to show what the use of the Rossie
Hills property would have been worth; indeed, Doms has offered evidence to show that he
did not use the property at all as he was unable to develop it as planned. The propeity
remains raw ground at the present time and has never had so much as a shovel full of dirt
moved upon it.
(b)

The law of the case is that Doms is entitled to all sums paid to Plaintiffs on the
contract.
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On pages 19-21 of their Responsive Brief, Plaintiffs continue to "beat the dead horse"
that Doms is only entitled to one-half of the sums paid to Plaintiffs. As indicated previously,
this Court has clearly laid that issue to rest; it is the law of the case and ought not to be
disturbed. See Anderson II, at ^[21 (awarding "to Doms" net payments, etc.).
Plaintiffs also seem to argue another issue which has previously been put to rest by
this Court: that this case involved multiple contracts because there was a separate financing
document, the Trust Deed Note, along with the WaiTanty Deed. This particular argument
is clearly a red herring as this Court ruled in Anderson II:
Although Doms failed to make payments required by the Trust Deed Note,
he was excused from doing so as a result of Plaintiffs' breach of the
covenant against encumbrances. See Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp.,
883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)("The law is well settled that a
material breach by one party to a contract excuses further performance by
the non-breaching party."); ... Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123,1125
(Utah 1984)("if it plainly appears that a seller has lost or encumbered his
ownership so that he will not be able to fulfill his contract, he cannot insist
that a buyer continue to make payments.") Any prejudice that resulted from
Doms' failure to make payments pursuant to the Trust Deed Note was
precipitated by Plaintiffs' breach of warranty.
Anderson II at ^[17.
Therefore, this Court has clearly held, and it is now the law of the case, that Plaintiffs'
breach of the statutory warranty against encumbrances was a material breach and excused
Doms from further performance. Thus, the efforts of Plaintiffs to talk about a distinction
between "multiple contracts" and a "single transaction contract" is a distinction without a
difference and has no materiality or relevance to the issues before the Court.
Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court was not required to award the interest paid as
part of the original contract as claimed by Doms because "a trial court retains some
9

discretion in implementing an appellate court decision," citing Gildea v. Guardian Title
Company, 2001 UT 75, \% 31 P.3d 543. Plaintiffs' Brief misinterprets Gildea. Gildea
actually holds that the law of the case doctrine "generally bind[s] the trial court on remand"
and that it should be abandoned only under the "exceptional circumstances'5 discussed above
(i.e. change of controlling authority, availability of new evidence, or clear error causing
manifest injustice). See id. at \9.
Plaintiffs have identified none of these three "exceptional circumstances" as being
present in this case. Plaintiffs have not identified an intervening change of controlling
authority; they did not attempt to introduce new evidence in the trial court after this Court's
decision m Anderson II; and they do not now argue that this Court's decision remanding the
case was "clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." See id. Therefore the
exceptions under Gildea cannot apply and the law of the case doctrine must be enforced.
(2)

The law of the case doctrine bars Plaintiffs' attempt to retry the rescission
issue; in any event, rescission is appropriate because the parties can be
returned to the status quo.

As part of their Cross-Appeal, Plaintiffs again argue, without citing an "exceptional
circumstance," that the law of the case doctrine ought not to apply and that this Court may
have carved out some sort of exception to that doctrine when it stated in Anderson II: "In
fashioning an appropriate remedy for rescission the rule is equitable, and requires practicality
in adjusting the rights of the parties. How this is to be accomplished, or indeed whether it
can, is a matter which is in the discretion of the trial court . . . "

Anderson II at ^[20.

Plaintiffs claim that the trial court should not have ordered rescission because the parties
could not be returned to the positions they occupied before the contract. In their Point II,
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Plaintiffs seem to argue that this Court was wrong when it initially ordered the trial court to
reconsider rescission as a remedy in Anderson v. Doms Memorandum Decision (Not For
Publication) 920653-CA, filed November 4,1994 (hereinafter cited as Anderson I) (See Add.
3) and wrong when it upheld that decision in Anderson II. Once again, the lav/ of the case
doctrine bars Plaintiffs' argument. There is absolutely no reason for this Court, after now
some twenty years and three separate appeals in this case, to change its mind and decide that
rescission is not an appropriate remedy. In any event, Plaintiffs' argument is without merit,
as the discussion below demonstrates.
(a)

The encroachments on the property matured before Poms' occupancy; thus no
encroachment affects the parties' ability to be returned to the status quo.

Plaintiffs' begin their argument against rescission by declaring that the parties cannot
be returned to the status quo because encroachments on the property have matured during
Doms' occupancy and cannot now be challenged. This is clearly and absolutely an untrue
statement. Doms would like to believe that the problem herein relates to the change of
counsel in this case. Counsel writing the Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, Larry A. Kirkham,
having come on board in this third appeal after an almost nineteen year case history, was
apparently not aware of the Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
relating to the encumbrance issue when he made his arguments on page 26 of his Responsive
Brief and Brief on Cross-Appeal. In its Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law (attached as Add. 2) the trial court made findings that have never been challenged by
either side or disturbed on appeal. The Second Amended Findings of Fact state as follows:
7. Access to the Rossie Hills Property at the time Doms and McCoy
purchased the property was via a graded right-of-way extending in a
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northeasterly direction from the old rail right-of-way south of block 59 as
shown in defendants' Exhibit 77D.
10. Said loop road has been used openly, notoriously, continuously, and
adversely by the residents who reside on Ontario Avenue and whose rear
property borders, or intrudes upon the Rossie Hills Property, for a period
in excess of 40 years as of the date of March 23, 1982, the date of delivery
of the Warranty Deed by grantors to defendant Doms. Such use was for
ingress and egress to the rear of their property, and for parking.
11. Along the westerly boundaries of the lots in block 58 are
encroachments such as sheds, fences and decks owned and used by
adjoining property owners to the west. (See defendant's Exhibit 77D.)
13. These encroachments, including the backyard areas bordered by said
fences, had been used openly, notoriously, continuously and adversely for
a period in excess of 20 years as of March 23, 1982 by the aforementioned
property owners, and such use continues through present time.
(R. 6878, 6879 )(emphases added).) These Findings of Fact resulted in Second Amended
Conclusions of Law 1-5. (R. 6889, 6890.)
Therefore, it is certainly misleading and clearly a misstatement of the lower court's
findings for Plaintiffs to argue that the "encroachments on the property have matured during
Doms' occupancy." This is simply not true and no evidence for this assertion was ever
presented to the lower court in any proceeding.
(b)

The ability of the parties to be returned to the status quo is unaffected by the
death of one of Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs also claim that they cannot be returned to the status quo because one of the
Plaintiffs died and the estate has been settled. That specific argument was made to this Court
during the briefing of the first Doms appeal which resulted in this Court's Memorandum
Decision (Not For Publication) in Anderswn /(Add. 3). Plaintiffs' argument was that a claim
against Plaintiff D.C. Anderson was barred by Utah's nonclaims statute. Defendant Doms
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responded by arguing that his causes of action against the Estate of D.C. Anderson are not
"claims" under the Uniform Probate Code, and therefore need not have been filed against the
Estate pursuant to U.C.A. § 75-3-801 and § 75-3-803. Doms cited the case of In re: Estate
of Sharp, 537 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1975), in which the Utah Supreme Court held that an
equitable action against an estate is not a claim within the meaning of the above statutes and
that a "claim . . . refers to debts or demands against the decedent which might have been
enforced in his lifetime, by personal actions for the recoveiy of money; and upon which only
a money judgment could have been rendered." 537 P.2d at 1037 (emphasis added).1
In Anderson I this Court did not rule specifically on this issue but did hold as follows:
"We agree with the trial court's decision to allow Doms to proceed with his Counterclaim
and find Appellants' arguments to be without merit. Thus, we decline to address them." See
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 896 (Utah 1989)(court may decline to address arguments
without merit on appeal); Anderson I &t2 (Add. 3). Later, the court went on to say, "Because
it is possible that the trial court will order the contract rescinded due to lack of evidence in
the record concerning prejudice, we need not address the other claims raised. . . ." Id at 3
n.2.

1

Defendant Doms also cited the following cases in accord with this opinion by the
Utah Supreme Court: Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 77 (Utah 1982); In re Estate of
Malliet, 649 P.2d 18 (Utah 1982); In re Estate of Peterson, 716 P.2d 801 (Utah 1986);
Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah 1980). See also Reed v. Sixth Judicial
District Court, 341 P.2d 100 (Nev. 1959); Wright v. Universal Tire, Inc., 577 S.W.2d 194
(Tenn. App. 1978), cert, denied 1979; Bank of California v. Connolly, 111 Cal. Rptr. 468
(Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1974).
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Thus, once again, the law of the case doctrine should prevent this Court from needing
to revisit the non-claims issue. Plaintiffs' argument simply cannot stand in the way of
rescission in this matter. Even if this Court should find that it does, the argument prevents
rescission only as to one of the four Plaintiffs; certainly the death of one of the Plaintiffs
should not allow the other Plaintiffs to escape rescission in this matter.
(c)

The ability of the parties to be returned to the status quo is unaffected by
McCoy's ''subsequent transfer" to Doms.

Plaintiffs again continue to "beat the dead horse" in their argument that the parties
cannot be returned to the status quo by claiming that subsequent transfers of the Rossie Hills
propeity after its purchase by Doms and McCoy foreclose rescission. While admitting that
"the Court of Appeals resolved the issue of ownership by simply stating that Doms is the
owner of the propeity and the successor to DomCoy," they again present the argument that
Doms received originally only a one-half interest in the propeity. Again however, they
completely ignore the doctrine of the law of the case on this point and refuse to accept the
proposition that this matter has been settled after 20 years of litigation and two prior appeals.
They give no reasons whatsoever as to why Doms, as record owner of the propeity, cannot
tender back to Plaintiffs the entire property. Therefore this argument must be dismissed
summarily by this Court.
In arguing that the law of the case doctrine ought not to apply in this case, and urging
this Court to reverse its previous decisions and orders, Plaintiffs cite the case of 50 West
Broadway Assocs. v. Redevelopment Agency^ 784 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1989).

However,

Plaintiffs miscite this decision. 50 West Broadway does not hold, as Plaintiffs argue, that
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[t]he ability to return the parties to the pre-contract status quo is a prerequisite for rescission

. . . . " (PL Br. at 24.) The case actually holds that "if the parties cannot be put back in status
quo, a contract can be rescinded only where the clearest and strongest reason and equity
imperatively demand it." 784 P.2d at 1170-71 (quoting 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 514, at
998 (1964)). In other words, even if the parties cannot be put back to the pre-contract status
quo, the contract can still be rescinded if there is a clear and strong reason for it. Plaintiffs'
Brief completely misstates this proposition.
More important, 50 West Broadway dealt with a case in which it was "clear beyond
peradventure that the parties cannot be returned to the status quo ante" (and therefore the
court found that damages were an appropriate remedy). Id. at 1171. But here it is "clear
beyond peradventure" that the parties can be returned to the status quo ante. As Plaintiffs
correctly admit, 50 West Broadway involved a landowner seeking rescission "after
subsequent reconveyances and development of the property." Id. at 1163-70. The raw
ground of the Rossie Hills Property has never been occupied by Doms, let alone developed.
Putting the parties back to their respective positions before the contract would not adversely
impact either side. And further, this Court should keep in mind when considering the
situation that it was Plaintiffs' actions, not Doms', that created the problem in the first place.
If the encumbrance had been disclosed by Plaintiffs, this lawsuit would not have resulted.
(3)

The law of the case is that it is irrelevant whether Doms or his partner
made the payments, and that all four Plaintiffs are responsible for
repayment.

Plaintiffs argue that even if the order of rescission was appropriate, the trial court
erred when it refused to determine the rights and responsibilities of the individual parties.
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Once again, Plaintiffs continue to argue that the amount Doms personally paid for the
property is all that should be refunded to him; and, they argue, an issue exists as to whether
Plaintiffs could refund the amounts ordered in equal shares. Plaintiffs argue that Doms is
entitled at the most to a fraction of the earnest money, down payment and taxes, again
despite the clear ruling of this Court.
It has consistently been the position of Defendant Doms that it does not matter
whether he or his partner or the corporation the two of them formed for a period of time paid
the monies in question to Plaintiffs, and this Court has accepted that position. Likewise, it
simply does not matter which of the Plaintiffs received the monies paid by Defendant Doms
(and/or McCoy and/or DomCoy, Inc.) and it should not be Defendant Doms' requirement
that he find a way to present evidence to the Court as to which of the four Plaintiffs received
which portion of the monies. All four Plaintiffs should be jointly and severally liable, and
this was the ruling of the lower court when it held in its Modified Judgment in this case
"Doms shall tender back to Plaintiffs all right, title and interest to the property subject to his
receiving the following sums . . . ." (R. 8950.)
Thus, the court clearly indicated that Defendant Doms should return the property to
all four Plaintiffs who had been the original grantors in the case, and was to receive the
return of monies ordered by the court from all four Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs should be
jointly and severally liable to return said monies to Defendant Doms as indicated by the trial
court. This the court implicitly ruled by not addressing the arguments made by Plaintiffs that
the Court should decide which Plaintiff should pay which sums to Doms. Since all four
Plaintiffs jointly owned and conveyed the property, and all four will receive it back, there
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can be no reason why they should not all four be jointly and severally liable to Doms for
amounts awarded by the Court in rescission of the contract.
(4)

Plaintiffs are procedurally barred from challenging the (rial court's
refusal to award rent; nonetheless, there is no basis for awarding rent.

Plaintiffs' Point IV is that the trial court committed error when it refused to award
them rent. They argue that the trial court's reasoning that the property was "raw ground,"
which was not used by Doms and therefore had no rental value, ignored statements made by
this Court in remanding the case. Plaintiffs are essentially challenging the trial court's
factual finding (in Finding of Fact No. 5 of its Modified Judgment) that the property had no
rental value. (R. 8951, attached as Add. 4.)
Under Utah law, when the party to an appeal challenges a court's findings, the party
is obligated "to marshal the evidence supporting the verdict and then show that such evidence
cannot support the verdict." Water & Energy Sys. Technology, Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32,
^}15, 48 P.3d 888. When the party does not meet its burden to marshal the evidence, the
appellate court must "assume that the evidence adequately supported the findings" and
disregard the complaining party's assertion. Id. Since Plaintiffs fail to mention that the
court's finding was based upon the fact that no evidence was ever presented to show any
rental value—and, further, that the court's findings were supported by Doms' evidence that
the property was "raw ground" and could not be used—Plaintiffs have not met their burden
to marshal the evidence. Their assertion that the court erred must therefore be disregarded.
That notwithstanding, Plaintiffs' arguments do not support the conclusion they urged
upon the lower court, and now urge upon this Court, because they have not shown that the
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tiial court's finding of no rental value was against the clear weight of the evidence, and thus
"cleaily erroneous "

See Pennington v Allstate Ins Co, 973 P 2d 932, 937 (Utah

1998)(noting that "we will not set aside a tiial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous," and explaining standard of cleai error)
Once again, it should be cleai fiom the recoid that no evidence whatsoevei of a fair
lental value of the property was presented to the lower court in the remand hearing
Plaintiffs were unable to refute the aigument that the giound was law giound when it was
pui chased and lemains in the exact same condition as it was when the contract of sale was
consummated 20 yeai s ago The mere fact that Defendant Doms pui chased the property tcfoi
tesidential development" is immaterial and melevant to the issue of lent undei cucumstances
wheie absolutely no development of any kind occurred This Court simply ordered, "we
theiefoie remand this issue to the trial court for a determination and award to Doms of the
net payments paid by him less lental value plus inteiest" Anderson II at fl21 This Court
did not older that the lower court must find a fan lental value, but simply implied that if
theie is evidence of rental value presented that the trial court finds persuasive, the court
should Ieduce the award by the rental value

Undei cucumstances wheie absolutely no

evidence whatsoever was presented to the trial court as to a fan lental value of the property,
this Court could not possibly have meant that the lower court was lequired to find a lental
value in the absence of such evidence
Plaintiffs cite Bel Ion v Malnar, 808 P 2d 1089 (Utah 1991), and Fullmer v Blood,
546 P 2d 606 (Utah 1976), foi the pioposition that inteiest paid on a contiact can be awarded
as a setoff to fan lental value Although this piinciple of law is obviously hue, when a court
18

orders such a setoff it is only under circumstances where the amount of interest paid
approximates the amount that constitutes fair rental value. These cases stand for the
proposition that a setoff is allowed; they do not state that in a situation where a court has
found there is no fair rental value to the property in question, a setoff against interest must
occur anyway. A trial court could never reasonably allow a seller who has breached
statutory warranties in conveying a parcel of real estate—which the court determines to have
no rental value—to obtain the windfall of a setoff against interest where rescission is
ordered. Neither Bellon nor Fullmer is controlling in the instant case.
The same can be said of the four other cases cited by Plaintiffs in this section.2 (PL
Br. at 32-33.) A careful review of each of these other cases shows that all of them involved
a finding of fair rental value that could be canceled by a setoff. Here, in contrast, there was
a specific finding that there was no fair rental value. Thus, these other cases are equally
unhelpful to Plaintiffs.
(5)

It is the law of the case that Doms was to receive "net payments paid,"
which necessarily includes taxes.

Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court should not have refunded taxes paid by Doms.
Despite the clear holding in Bergs from v. Moore, 677 P. 2d 1123 (Utah 1984), that the parties
should be restored to their original positions, and the clear holding of this Court that Doms
should receive "net payments paid by him less rental value plus interest," Plaintiffs argue that

2

The four cases are Larsen v. Potter, 571 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div.
1991); Bechardv. Bolton, 24 N.W.2d 422, 423 (Mich. 1946); Brink v. Larsen, 411
N.W.2d 585, 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); and Ohio Valley Trust Co. v. Allison, 89 A.
1132, 1134 (Pa. 1914).
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taxes "are not necessarily refundable." (PI. Br. at 35.) Plaintiffs once again cite the case of
Libassi v. Chelli, 615 N.Y.S.2d 75, 76 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), for this proposition. As
explained above, the Libassi court refused to award interest and taxes because the buyers in
that case had committed fraud; furthermore, the sellers in Libassi were not at fault at all.
Here, the sellers were at fault, and Doms had clean hands.
Plaintiffs also cite once again Bechard v. Bolton, 24 N.W.2d 422, 423 (Mich. 1946),
for this same proposition. As explained above, the court in Bechard was tiying to set off a
reasonable rental value of the property by not awarding interest and taxes. Here, there was
no rental value. Neither Libassi nor Bechard has any application to the instant case.
(6)

Plaintiffs are precluded from raising the prejudgment interest issue now
because they failed to raise it in the lower court; even so, prejudgment
interest is required under these circumstances.

Finally, Plaintiffs raise the prejudgment interest issue. Plaintiffs correctly point out
that "Doms cited no case which would justify an award of prejudgment interest." (PI. Br.
at 37.) However, Plaintiffs never raised the issue of prejudgment interest in the court below.
They argued that Doms should not receive the interest payments on the contract but never
once raised the issue of prejudgment interest regarding any amounts ordered by the Court to
be returned to Doms. Plaintiffs are precluded from raising the issue now. It is black-letter
law that "to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first raise the issue in the
trial court." Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)(citing DeBry v.
Cascade Enters., 835 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah 1997), and declining to hear plaintiffs' argument
on appeal because it was not "adequately raised" below"). In other words,
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a trial court must be offered an opportunity to rule on an issue. A trial court
has the opportunity to rule if the following three requirements are met: (1) the
issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically
raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal
authority. The purpose of such requirements is to put the judge on notice of
the asserted error and allow the opportunity for correction at that time in the
course of the proceeding.
Id. (internal quotations, alterations, and citations omitted). Furthennore, Plaintiffs have not
cited to the record showing that this issue was preserved in the trial court or, if they admit
it was not preserved, stated any grounds for seeking review of it now—as required by Utah
Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5).
In any event, Plaintiffs claim that "[prejudgment interest is not awarded in equity
cases such as this" and cite BeUon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991). as authority for
this veiy broad proposition. (PL Br. at 36.) Their claim is wrong, and Bellon neither stands
for that proposition nor impairs Doms' claim for prejudgment interest.
More recently than Bellon and without overruling it, the Utah Supreme Court has said
that cc[t]he law on this issue is clear," and has explained as follows:
Where the damage is complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as of a
particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts and figures, interest
should be allowed from that time ... and not from the date ofjudgment. On the
other hand, where damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated with
mathematical accuracy, such as in the case of personal injury, wrongful death,
defamation of character, false imprisonment, etc., the amount of the damages
must be ascertained and assessed by the trier of fact at the trial, and in such
cases prejudgment interest is not allowed.
Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995)(quoting Canyon Country Store v.
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989))(grammatical alternations omitted). The Cornia
court refused to allow prejudgment interest not because of the type of claim that was present,
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but because u[w]ithout any clear factual information, plaintiffs' damages could not be
measured by facts and figures or calculated with mathematical accuracy." Cornia, 898 P.2d
at 1387 (internal quotations omitted).
Bell on involved a damages calculation that could not be calculated with mathematical
accuracy because the trial court was required to exercise its "conscience and discretion" in
determining the correct market value of the disputed property at the time of default. Bellon,
808 P.2d at 1097. In contrast, Doms5 claim for prejudgment interest did not require the
"conscience and discretion" of the trial court; all that was required was proof of Doms'
payments, the dates of those payments, and a calculator. Using these simple and accurate
instruments, the trial court in its Modified Judgment easily ascertained the principal amount
at issue—as well as the amount of prejudgment interest—with mathematical accuracy.3
Thus, the fact that rescission is an equitable remedy is irrelevant. The determinative
factor is whether the damages can be assessed with mathematical accuracy, the underlying
concern being, as this Court has pointed out since Bellon (and in an attempt to explain it),
a desire to protect against "a risk of double recovery." Shoreline DeveL, Inc. v. Utah County,

3

The relevant portion of the Modified Judgment reads as follows:
"3. Doms shall tender back to Plaintiffs all right, title and interest to the property
subject to his receiving the following sums:
a. $10,000.00 earnest money at 10% interest from the date of payment which shall
be the sum of $28,731.51 through August 1, 2000 and $2.74 per day thereafter;
b. The sum of $72,500.00 constituting the down payment at 10% simple interest
which shall be the sum of $205,959.59 through August 1, 2000 and $19.86 per day
thereafter;
c. All payments made for taxes on the property at 10% interest from the date the
payment was made which shall be the sum of $23,070.73 through August 1, 2000 and
$4.26 per day thereafter."
22

835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). There is an overriding (but in cases before
Shoreline, unspoken) presumption that the judgment in an equity case already includes
interest and that adding prejudgment interest to that judgment could cause a double recovery.
Even this Court in Anderson II exhibited an awareness of this presumption when it instructed
the trial court on remand to "fashion an adequate and reasonable remedy ... so long as that
remedy is not duplicative." Anderson //at ^[20. Here, where the damages can be (and were)
assessed with perfect mathematical accuracy and where such damages do not already include
interest, there is no risk that "prejudgment interest may be added to a jury's equity award by
the trial court who does not know whether the jury's award covers interest" (Shoreline, 835
P.2d at 211), and prejudgment interest is appropriate. Prejudgment interest is, in fact,
specifically allowed because "where justice and equity require, interest may be awarded as
part of the damages." Id. (citing Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885,
887 (Utah 1976)).
Finally, Plaintiffs cite BLTInvestment Co. v. Snow, 586 P.2d 456 (Utah 1978) for the
proposition that Doms should not be allowed prejudgment interest. The exact holding in
BLT Investment was that a party "may not avoid the contract and, at the same time, claim the
benefit" of a provision in that contract. Id. at 458. But Doms does not "claim the benefit"
of any interest provision in the contract for the Rossie Hills property. To the contrary, Doms
only argues that Plaintiffs should not be allowed to keep a benefit of a contract (the interest
paid by buyers) that is being rescinded. As the court in BLT Investment itself said, "The
authorities generally hold that rescission extinguishes the contract so effectually that it never
had any existence." Id. Yet if Plaintiffs are allowed to have used the benefit of several
23

hundred thousand dollars of Doms' money over a period in excess of twenty years without
being required to pay any interest on such use, the contract could hardly be said to have
never existed. Since a determination can be made with mathematical certainty as to the
damages to Defendant Doms and since there is no risk of double recovery, Defendant Doms
is entitled to prejudgment interest under U.C.A. § 15-1-1.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that Plaintiffs are simply trying to relitigate issues that have already been
decided by this Court and which constitute the law of the case. Plaintiffs have given this
Court no "exceptional circumstance" on which to justify relitigating these issues; therefore
they are precluded from raising these issues. In any event, the arguments made by Plaintiffs
concerning these issues are without merit.
To the extent Plaintiffs ask this Court to find error in the trial court's refusal to grant
a setoff for fair rental value, they are asking this Court to overrule a factual finding of the
trial court. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the trial court committed clear error in
finding that there was no rental value to the property.
Finally, Plaintiffs' attempt to raise the issue of prejudgment interest is barred
procedurally and unsound on its merits. It would be a gross inequity not to award Doms
prejudgment interest, and would effectively nullify this Court's own earlier ruling that
rescission is appropriate.
This Court is asked to finally end over seventeen years of litigation (the litigation
began approximately three years after the contract between the parties was consummated)
by reversing the trial court's Judgment where it refused to award Doms the $72,520.00 in
24

interest payments plus prejudgment and postjudgment interest at the appropriate legal rates,
and affirming all other aspects of the Court's Modified Judgment in this case. This Court
is asked to reject the erroneous arguments of Plaintiffs and conclude this litigation once and
for all.

DATED this _A_ day of

4 - ^ ^

2002.

COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant/CrossAppellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed,
by first class U.S. postage prepaid, this lu^Vvday of ^c**V, 2002, to:
Larry A. Kirkham
Attorney at Law
871 East 9400 South
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gious to permit the imposition of the death
penalty. See State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d
1232, 1248 (Utah 1993) ("we can confidently
say beyond a reasonable doubt that even if
the jury had not considered the invalid aggravator, it would have returned a verdict of
death"), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 979, 114 S.Ct.
476, 126 L.Ed.2d 427 (1993). The trial court
found overwhelming aggravating evidence
and rejected all of Lovell's mitigation theories. As in Archuleta, leaving out the "personal gain" aggravator would not have reduced Lovell's sentence, so any error is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

CONCLUSION
1147 Because we find that all of Lovell's
claims fail, we affirm his conviction and sentence of death.
Chief Justice HOWE, Justice STEWART,
Justice ZIMMERMAN, and Justice
RUSSON concur in Associate Chief Justice
DURHAM'S opinion.

.

JH\
CQ

| lit NUMBER SYSTEM >

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
[14] 11 46 Lovell claims that his trial counsel performed ineffectively because he did
not raise the constitutional challenges to the
specific aggravating circumstances that Lovell raises on appeal. In order to prove his
claim, Lovell must identify specific acts or
omissions by counsel which fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, overcoming the presumption that counsel rendered constitutionally adequate assistance.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-S8, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984). Furthermore, under Strickland, Lovell must also affirmatively prove that the
challenged acts or omissions undermine confidence in the outcome of his trial. See Id. at
694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. As we have discussed,
Lovell's counsel had no basis on which to
challenge the constitutionality of the death
penalty statute, including the specific aggravators. The constitutionality of the statute
has been upheld by this Court, so counsel
had no reason to believe he could make a
legitimate constitutional challenge. As we
have noted, the trial court could and did
consider all the evidence in the case under
the general sentencing provision, without relying explicitly on the specific aggi'avators as
aggravators challenged by Lovell. Lovell
fails to establish that his counsel's failure to
challenge the statutory provisions fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness.
Therefore, Lovell's claim does not overcome
the strong presumption that counsel performed adequately; Lovell's constitutional
claims must fail.
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Ellen ANDERSON, as personal representative of the Estate of D.C. Anderson;
Dan Scott; Ellen Anderson, personally;
and Jeanne Scott, Plaintiffs, Appellees,
and Cross appellants,
v.

Eugene E. DOMS and Michael R. McCoy,
Defendants, Appellant, and Cross
appellee.
No. 971762-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 24, 1999.

Vendors brought suit for foreclosure
based on default on trust deed note given to
secure balance owed on purchase price. Purchaser counterclaimed for rescission or damages for breach of implied covenants, breach
of contract, fraud, and misrepresentation.
Following bench trial, the District Court denied request for rescission based upon laches
and awarded purchaser monetary damages
as result of encumbrances on property. The
Court of Appeals remanded for additional
findings on laches. On remand, the District
Court again held that laches barred rescission and awarded attorney fees and costs.
Both sides appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Greenwood, J., held that: (1) vendors did not
suffer requisite prejudice tto support laches
bar to rescission claim; (2) rescission was
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appropriate remedy for vendors' breach of
covenant; (3) there was no statutory or contractual basis to support award of fees and
costs to purchaser; and (4) vendors were
entitled to fees incurred in securing default
judgment on foreclosure claim that was subsequently vacated.

7. Vendor and Purchaser (S=>119
Loss in value of property did not by
itself show that vendors were prejudiced by
purchaser's delay in bringing rescission action, so as to raise laches bar to rescission
claim.

Reversed and remanded.

8. Equity <3=>72(4)

Bench, J., dissented.

Increase or decrease in the value of
property alone does not satisfy the prejudice
prong of the laches defense.

1. Appeal and Error <£=> 1008.1(8.1)
Although the determination of whether a
party was prejudiced for purposes of the
doctrine of laches is a legal conclusion that is
reviewed for correctness, trial court's findings of fact underlying that conclusion will
not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.
2. Appeal and Error <3=>842(1)
Whether attorney fees are recoverable is
a question of law which is reviewed for correctness.
3. Appeal and Error <S=>1024.1
The sufficiency of a trial court's findings
supporting an award of attorney fees is reviewed under a correction-of-error standard.
4. Appeal and Error <3=757(3)
Appellant was relieved of his burden to
marshal evidence by reason of inadequacy of
trial court's findings, which were unsupported in record or did not support ultimate
conclusion on issue of laches.
5. Vendor and Purchaser <^=»119
Purchaser's failure to pay taxes on property and resulting tax sale did not prejudice
vendors, so as to support laches bar based on
purchaser's delay in seeking rescission of
real estate contract, where tax sale was ultimately declared void and purchaser paid taxes and regained title to property.
6. Vendor and Purchaser ^ l ^
Delay in seeking rescission of real estate
contract did not prejudice vendors through
loss of witnesses or evidence, so as to raise
laches bar to rescission claim, despite death
of one vendor in interim, absent proof that
vendors were deprived, to their prejudice, of
a
ny specific evidence or testimony.

9. Vendor and Purchaser <3=>119
Trial court's finding that it would be
inequitable to allow purchaser to rescind contract because he would benefit from his poor
decisions, was moral judgment, not fact finding, and did not support conclusion that vendors were prejudiced by purchaser's delay in
seeking rescission of contract and that rescission was accordingly barred by laches.
10. Vendor and Purchaser G ^ l ^
Purchaser's failure to make payments
under trustee deed note did not show that
vendors were prejudiced by purchaser's failure to perform, so as to impose laches barbased on purchaser's delay in bringing rescission action, where any prejudice was precipitated by vendors' breach of covenant
against encumbrances.
11. Vendor and Purchaser <®=>119
Absent proof that vendors were prejudiced by purchaser's several year delay in
bringing action to rescind real estate purchase contract, laches did not bar relief.
12. Vendor and Purchaser <S=*110
Rescission of contract was proper remedy for vendor's breach of covenant against
encumbrances.
13. Vendor and Purchaser <s=*126
Upon rescission of contract for vendor's
breach of warranty in case in which purchaser made no significant improvements or
changes to real property, purchaser was entitled to return of net payments made on trust
deed note less rental value of property plus
interest.

394

Utah

984 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

14. Costs €=>194.16
Attorney fees are recoverable only if
there is a statutory or contractual basis for
awarding such fees.
15. Covenants <s=> 132(2)
Purchaser who was successful in obtaining rescission of real estate contract based on
breach of covenant against encumbrances
was not entitled to award of fees, as there
was no statute or contractual provision justifying award for rescission remedy and purchaser did not incur attorney fees in any
attempt to remove encumbrances.
16. Mortgages <3=>5S0, 581(3)
Vendors were entitled to attorney fees
and costs incurred in securing default judgment in foreclosure action against purchaser
under trust deed note, but not to other fees
incurred in litigation after default judgment
was vacated, as purchaser ultimately prevailed.

Larry R. Keller, Keller & Lundgren Lc,
Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Irving H. Biele and Curtis C. Nessett,
Nygaard, Coke & Vincent, Salt Lake City,
for Appellees.
Before GREENWOOD, Associate P.J., and
BENCH and DAVIS, JJ.
OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
111 Defendant Eugene E. Doms appeals
for the second time the trial court's denial of
his request to rescind a real estate contract.
Plaintiffs Ellen Anderson and Dan and
Jeanne Scott cross-appeal, arguing, among
other things, that the doctrine of laches bars
recission of the contract 1 Both parties appeal the trial court's award of attorney fees
and costs. We reverse and remand.
1. Because the resolution of whether laches bars
rescission in this case is dispositive, we do not
address plaintiffs' alternative arguments
2. Before purchasing the property, Doms wa*.
aware of the existence of several roads and sheds

BACKGROUND
112 In March 1982, plaintiffs Dan and
Jeanne Scott, Ellen Anderson, and D.C.
Anderson, Ellen Anderson's now deceased
husband, sold a parcel of property known as
Rossi Hills (the property) in Park City, Utah,
to Doms and Michael R. McCoy for residential development. In connection with this
sale, plaintiffs executed a Warranty Deed
that included a covenant against encumbrances. Doms and McCoy executed a Trust
Deed and Trust Deed Note to secure payment of the balance owed on the purchase
price of $194,250. Doms and McCoy also
acquired an interest in a parcel adjoining the
property known as the "slipper parcel."
McCoy no longer has any interest in the
property and is not involved in this appeal.
113 In late 1984 or early 1985, Doms's
attorney informed him that several encroachments and easements existed on the proper-.
ty.2 As a result, Doms did not make the
scheduled payments on the property and attempted to deed the property back to plaintiffs in return for cancellation of the Trust
Deed Note. Plaintiffs did not respond to this
offer and, in June 1985, filed a complaint
seeking to foreclose on the property. Two
years later, plaintiffs obtained a default judgment against Doms and McCoy because they
failed to file an answer in response to plaintiffs' complaint Nine days after entry of the
default judgment, Doms filed an answer and
counterclaim to plaintiffs' complaint. Approximately four months later, the trial court
entered an order setting aside the default
judgment against Doms on the condition that
Doms pay all attorney fees incurred by plaintiffs in obtaining the default judgment
However, the court reserved a final ruling on
the award of these fees until final disposition
of the case on the merits.
114 In May 1987, the property was sold to
Summit County in a foreclosure sale for the
nonpayment of property taxes. At that time,
title to the property was held by Domcoy, a
corporation formed by Doms and McCoy, to
on the pioperty However, according to Doms,
it was not until approximately two years after the
purchase of the property that he learned of the
legal significance of the encumbrances on the
property.
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which they had transferred their interest in
the property. After Doms paid all delinquent taxes, penalties, interest, and costs,
Summit County conveyed the property to
Domcoy by quitclaim deed. Domcoy then
conveyed the property to Doms.3 In the
meantime, plaintiffs had filed another action
challenging the tax sale and subsequent purchase of the property by Summit County,
seeking to quiet title to the property in their
favor. Upon stipulation of Summit County,
plaintiffs, and Doms, the trial court set aside
the tax sale.

improperly applied the doctrine of laches to
bar rescission of the contract without first
entering findings of fact regarding whether
plaintiffs were prejudiced by Doms's delay in
seeking rescission. See Anderson v. Doms,
No. 920653-CA, slip op. at 2-3 (Utah CtApp.
Nov. 4, 1994) (unpublished mem. decision).
Consequently, this court remanded the case
to the trial court for further findings on the
issue of prejudice, stating, "If the trial court
cannot find from the evidence presented that
the [plaintiffs] were prejudiced by the delay,
the equitable doctrine of laches should not
bar
the remedy of rescission." Id On re11 5 In early 1988, Doms amended his counmand,
the trial court again refused to rescind
terclaim, seeking rescission of the contract
the
contract,
concluding plaintiffs were prejuor, in the alternative, damages for breach of
diced
by
Doms's
delay in seeking rescission.
implied covenants, breach of contract, fraud,
and misrepresentation. In 1990, the trial This appeal followed.
was bifurcated and a three day trial was held
on the issue of rescission of the contract. ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Plaintiffs argued, on the basis of laches, that
[1] 118 Doms argues he is entitled to
Doms was prohibited from rescinding the rescission because the trial court's findings
contract because there was an unreasonable on remand do not support its conclusion that
delay between the time Doms learned of the plaintiffs were prejudiced by his delay in
basis for rescission and his attempt to re- seeking rescission of the contract. See Barscind the contract. The trial court subse- land v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah
quently issued a Memorandum Decision, 1987) ("To successfully assert a laches definding that because Doms unreasonably de- fense, a [party] must establish both that the
layed seeking rescission, laches barred re- [other party] unreasonably delayed in bringscission of the contract.
ing an action [to rescind the contract] and
H 6 The remainder of the trial focused on that the defendant was prejudiced by that
the issue of whether Doms was entitled to delay." (citing Papanikolas Bros. Enter, v.
damages as a result of the encumbrances on Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 535 P.2d
the property. The trial court also held a 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975))). Although the de-hearing on the issue of attorney fees. In its termination of whether a party was prejuSecond Amended Findings of Fact and Con- diced for purposes of the doctrine of laches is
clusions of Law and Second Amended Judg- a legal conclusion that we review for correctment, the trial court, based upon laches, de- ness, we will not set aside a trial court's
nied Doms's request for rescission and findings of fact underlying that conclusion
awarded Doms $83,000 in damages as a re- unless they are clearly erroneous. See Sweesult of the encumbrances on the property ney Land Co. v. Kimball, 786 P.2d 760, 761
and $101.50 in costs. The trial court also (Utah 1990).
awarded $41,333.20 in attorney fees and
[2,3] 11 9 Doms also challenges the trial
costs, plus interest, to plaintiffs.
court's award of attorney fees and costs.
U 7 Both parties appealed the trial court's
decision on several grounds. This court subsequently issued an unpublished Memorandum Decision holding that the trial court

Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a
question of law which we review for correctness. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d
305, 314 (Utah 1998) (citing Robertson v.

3. * On remand, the trial court found that the conveyance of the property from Summit County to
•Doms after the tax sale resulted in Doms holding
dear title to the property " Therefore, plain-

tiffs' arguments premised on the contention that
Doms did not hold title to the entire parcel are
without merit.
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Gem Ins., 828 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah Ct.App.
1992)). The sufficiency of a trial court's findings supporting an award of attorney fees is
also reviewed under a eorrection-of-error
standard. See id. Finally, although trial
courts are normally afforded broad discretion
in determining what constitutes a reasonable
fee, see id., such an award " 'must be based
on the evidence and supported by findings of
fact'" Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d
890, 893 (Utah 1996) (quoting Cottonwood
Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah
1992)).

est in the slipper parcel and would likely
refuse to cooperate with plaintiffs in developing the adjoining property. However, plaintiffs do not dispute that Doms's interest in
the slipper parcel was extinguished at a tax
sale. Because this finding is inaccurate an<}
without record support, it is clearly errone^
ous and has no relevance to the issue ,pf
prejudice.
B.

Finding 10b 5

[5] 11 12 Finding 10b states that plaintiffs
were prejudiced as a result of Doms's failure
to pay taxes on the property. However, we
ANALYSIS
cannot see how failure to pay property taxes
I. Findings of Fact
prejudiced plaintiffs. Doms ultimately paid
[4] 11 10 In challenging the trial court's the taxes and regained title to the property.
findings of fact, Doms argues he should be Further, all parties stipulated that the tax
relieved of his burden to marshal the evi- sale was void and that plaintiffs' trust deed
dence because of the inadequacy of the trial was a valid lien on the property. Thus,
court's findings. See Woodivard v. Fazzio, finding 10b does not support the trial court's
823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct.App.1991) ("There conclusion that plaintiffs were prejudiced by
is, in effect, no need for an appellant to Doms's delay.
marshal the evidence when the findings are
C. Findings 10c 6 and lOd 7
so inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully challenged as factual determinations.").
[6] 11 13 Findings 10c and lOd both state
We agree. Because the findings Doms chal- that Doms's delay in seeking rescission relenges are either unsupported in the record sulted in the unavailability of witnesses. Alor do not support the conclusion that plain- though it is true that one party to the origi
:
tiffs were prejudiced, we agree that Doms is, nal transaction, D.C. Anderson, had died and
for the most part, relieved of the marshaling other witnesses may have become unavailrequirement. We therefore address Doms's able or forgotten information relevant to the
specific challenges to the trial court's find- sale of the property, these findings do not
ings of fact.
demonstrate that plaintiffs were deprived of
A. Finding 10a 4
1111 Finding 10a provides that plaintiffs
were prejudiced because Doms has an inter4.

Finding 10a states:
Doms had the use and benefit of the property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs. He purchased the slipper parcel and attempted to
formulate a plan for a three-parcel integrated development, but was unsuccessful. The
plaintiffs are nov foreclosed from developing an integrated development because
Doms has an interest in the slipper parcel
and the likelihood of Domsf's] cooperation
with the plaintiffs in an integrated development is remote.

5.

any specific evidence or testimony or how
lack of that evidence would adversely affect
plaintiffs. Because Findings 10c and lOd are
conclusory and do not include any informa-

Finding 10b states: "Doms failed to pay the
property taxes for the years 1982, 1983, 1984,
1985 and 1986, which resulted in a tax sale and

required the plaintiffs to initiate legal action to
clear the title."
6.

Finding of fact 10c states: "D.C. Anderson, one
of the principals in the transaction, died while
Doms was in possession of the property, thus t
making it impossible to elicit testimony from the
decedent."

7.

Finding of fact lOd states: "Doms'[s] delay of
more than six (6) years before he sought to
rescind the transaction adversely affected the
plaintiffs' opportunity to resolve the encroachment and easement problems because witnesses
would be unavailable and memories are dimmed
by the lapse of time."
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tion about testimony that plaintiffs could not
elicit as a result of the delay, these findings
do not support the trial court's conclusion of
prejudice.
1114 Finding lOd also states that plaintiffs
were prejudiced because Doms's delay prevented them from resolving the encroachments on the property. However, plaintiffs
have not shown how Doms's delay made removing the encroachments any more difficult
than it would have been before the sale of
the property or in the event plaintiffs reacquire the property. Thus, finding lOd does
not show that plaintiffs were prejudiced by
Doms's delay.

E.

Finding lOg 1

[9] 1116 Finding lOg states that it would
be inequitable to allow Doms to rescind the
contract because he ushould not benefit from
his poor decisions." Because this statement
appears to be nothing more than a moral
judgment, unsupported by any evidence or
law, we cannot say that it supports the trial
court's conclusion that plaintiffs were prejudiced.
F.

Finding lOh

n

[7,8] 1115 Findings lOe and lOf state that
plaintiffs were prejudiced because the property suffered a fifty percent decrease in value during the time that Doms possessed it.
The first time this case was appealed, we
specifically rejected the argument that an
increase or decrease in the value of property
alone satisfies the prejudice prong of the
laches defense. See Child v. Child, 8 Utah
2d 261, 271, 332 P.2d 981, 988 (Utah 1958)
(stating "natural increment" in value of property does not, standing alone, constitute prejudice for purposes of laches doctrine); see
also West Los Angeles Inst for Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 228 (9th
Cir.1966) (same). Rather, a change in property value is only one factor a court may
consider in determining prejudice for the
purpose of laches. See Lawson v. Haynes,
170 F.2d 741, 744 (10th Cir.1948); Filler v.
Richland, 247 Mont. 285, 806 P.2d 537, 540
(1991); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156,
159 (Utah 1976). Therefore, the trial court's
finding that the property suffered a decrease
in value does not, in and of itself, show that
plaintiffs were prejudiced by Doms's delay.

[10] 1117 Finding lOh, actually a legal
conclusion, states that Doms may not rescind
the contract because he was in default. We
disagree. Although Doms failed to make
payments required by the Trust Deed Note,
he was excused from doing so as a result of
plaintiffs' breach of the covenant against encumbrances. See Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp, 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah CtApp.
1994) ("The law is well settled that a material
breach by one party to a contract excuses
further performance by the nonbreaching
party.") (citing Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d
796, 806 (Utah Ct.App.1992)); Wright u
Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah
Ct.App.1990); Bergstrovi v. Moore, 677 P.2d
1123, 1125 (Utah 1984) ("If it plainly appears
that a seller has lost or encumbered his
ownership so that he will not be able to fulfill
his contract, he cannot insist that a buyer
continue to make payments."). Any prejudice that resulted from Doms's failure to
make payments pursuant to the Trust Deed
Note was precipitated by plaintiffs' breach of
warranty. Because plaintiffs may not breach
the contract and then claim they were prejudiced by Doms's failure to perform, this finding does not suppoii, the trial court's conclusion that plaintiffs were prejudiced.

8- Finding of fact lOe states "During the time
Dorns, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc and Summit
County were in possession of the property, the
property suffered a 50% reduction in its value "

10. Finding of fact lOg states "Doms should not
benefit from his poor decision at the expense of
the plaintiffs To allow that to happen would be
inequitable."

D. Findings 10e 8 and 10f9

9- Finding of fact 1 Of states "Domsf's] inexperience in developing propeity or inability to sell
the property impacted the plaintiffs greatly because of down turn in the real estate market and
the increased costs to develop the property if
they chose to do so "

U . Finding of fact lOh states "Doms was in
default; therefore, he could not invoke the doctrine of rescission "
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[11] 1118 In our previous Memorandum
Decision in this case, we stated that "[i]f the
trial court cannot find from the evidence
presented that the appellants were prejudiced by the delay, the equitable doctrine of
laches should not bar the remedy of rescission." Anderson v. Doms, No. 920653-CA,
slip op. at 3 (Utah CtApp. Nov. 4, 1994)
(unpublished mem. decision). Having concluded the trial court's findings do not show
that plaintiffs were prejudiced, we next address the remedy of rescission.
II.

Rescission

[12] 1119 The only theory plaintiffs advance on appeal to bar rescission of the
contract is laches. This theory fails, however, because plaintiffs have not shown any
prejudice. Therefore, Doms is entitled to
rescind the contract as a remedy for breach
of warranty. Indeed, this remedy is consistent with Utah case law and that of other
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Bergstrom v. Moore,
677 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1984) (granting
rescission when seller breached covenant
against encumbrances and stating, '"mere
knowledge of encumbrances . . would not be
sufficient to exclude them from the operation
of the statutory covenant against encumbrances") (citing Jones v. Grow Inv. & Mortgage Co., 11 Utah 2d 326, 358 P.2d 909
(1961)); Breicer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe,
799 P.2d 716, 725 (Utah CtApp.1990) (affirming rescission of contract where, although
buyers were aware of encumbrance on property before purchase, they did not understand the legal implications of such encumbrance until five years after purchasing the
property).
[13] 1120 On remand, the trial .court
should determine what is necessary to restore the parties to the status quo at the time
the parties entered into the contract. See
Bergstrom, 677 P.2d at 1125 (affirming rescission of contract and placing parties in
original positions by allowing recovery of
payments already made under contract). In
fashioning an appropriate remedy for rescission, the rule
12. Doms is entitled to a refund of monies paid as
one of the original buyers of the property, and as

is equitable, and requires practicality ip
adjusting the rights of the parties. How
this is to be accomplished, or indeed
whether it can, is a matter which is within
the discretion of the trial court under the
facts as found to exist by the trier of fact,
The trial court therefore has discretion to
fashion an adequate and reasonable remedy so that an aggrieved party is adequately compensated for its loss, so long as that
remedy is not duplicative.
Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850
P.2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993) (citation & empha
sis omitted).
11 21 In this case, Doms apparently made
no improvements or changes to the property
such that the parties could not be returned to
their respective positions prior to entering
into the contract. We therefore remand this
issue to the trial court for a determination
and award to Doms of the net payments paid
by him less rental value plus interest.12 See
Bergstro?n, 677 P.2d at 1125.
III. Attorney Fees and Costs
[14,15] 1122 Both parties appeal from
the trial court's award of attorney fees and
costs. Attorney fees are recoverable only if
there is a statutory or contractual basis for
awarding such fees. See Foote v. Clark, 962
P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998) (stating attorney
fees will be awarded only when contract or
statute provides basis for award). Although
Doms requests fees for pursuing his rescission remedy, he cites no statute or contractual provision to justify such an award. Furthermore, because Doms has not incurred
attorney fees to remove the encumbrances
on the property, he is not entitled to fees
and costs incurred in conjunction with
breach of the covenant against encumbrances. See Forrer v. Sather, 595 P.2d
1306, 1308-09 (Utah 1979) (holding party
may recover attorney fees in connection with
breach of covenant against encumbrance
only "where the plaintiff purchased or extinguished the outstanding incumbrance" but
not for "fee[s] in an action against the covenantor for breach of the covenant"). We
the successor in interest to McCoy and Domcoy.
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therefore do not award any attorney fees to
Doms.
[16] 1123 Regarding the trial court's
award of fees and costs to plaintiffs, we
affirm the trial court's award of fees and
costs incurred in obtaining the default judgment. See Dixonweb Printing Co. v. Photo
Intercept
Coupon
Sys.,
94
Civ.
7436(MBM)(RLE), 1995 WL 384415, at *6,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8871, at *15
(S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1995) (affirming award of
attorney fees and costs to plaintiffs in obtaining default judgment "whether or not defendant's conduct is willful"). However, because
plaintiffs are not the prevailing party, we
vacate all other awards to plaintiffs. See
Loosie v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 858
P.2d 999, 1003 (Utah 1993) (denying request
for attorney fees because no basis for award
in connection with quiet title action where
promissory note and trust deed provided
only for attorney fees incurred in foreclosure). Thus, we remand to the trial court for
consideration of plaintiffs' counsel's evidence
regarding reasonable fees incurred in connection with obtaining the default judgment
and an appropriate award based on that evidence.

1127 I DISSENT:
BENCH, Judge.
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I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM >

NEWSPAPER AGENCY
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE
SERVICES and Teresa Ortiz,
Respondents.
No. 981369-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
July 9, 1999.

Claimant sought unemployment insurance benefits following separation from employment. The Department of Workforce
Services denied benefits, and claimant appealed. The Workforce Appeals Board reversed, granted benefits, and held that emCONCLUSION
ployer was responsible for its share of
11 24 The trial court's findings on remand benefit costs. Employer appealed. The
did not adequately show that plaintiffs were Court of Appeals, Onne, J., held that: (1)
prejudiced by Doms's delay in seeking rescis- claimant's appeal was timely filed, and (2)
sion of the contract. Furthermore, rescis- employer was not relieved of its assessed
sion of the contract in this case is consistent share of cost of claimant's unemployment
with Utah case law. Accordingly, the trial benefits.
court should order rescission and determine
Affirmed.
an appropriate remedy in connection with
rescinding the contract. We affirm the trial
court's denial of attorney fees to Doms. We
1. Appeal and Error <^S42(1)
also affirm the trial court's fee award to
The interpretation of statutes that raise
plaintiffs incurred in connection with obtaining the default judgment but vacate all other questions of law are reviewed for correctattorney fee awards to plaintiffs. Both par- ness.
ties shall bear their respective attorney fees
2. Administrative Law and Procedure
incurred on appeal.
<3=>391
U 25 Reversed and remanded.
The Court of Appeals grants an adminisH 26 I CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS,
Judge.

trative rule a presumption of validity in determining whether the rule is consistent with
governing statutes.
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D. C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON
personally, DAN SCOTT and
JEANNE SCOTT,
Plaintiffs

:
:
:
:
:
:

vs.

:

MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE
E. DOMS,

NO

FILED

:
:

Defendants

:

ELLEN ANDERSON as personal
representative of the Estate of
:
D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON
personally, DAN SCOTT and
JEANNE SCOTT,
Third-party

SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 8339

Plaintiffs
:

vs.

(Judge John A. Rokich)

SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Third-party

Defendant

CONSOLIDATED HEADING CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE
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ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee,

:
:
:
:

Plaintiffs

:

vs.

:

SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his
official capacity as Summit
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS;
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a
Utah corporation; EUGENE E.
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1,
2, 3, 4, and 5,

:
:
:
:
:

Civil No. 10066
(Judge John A. Rokich)

Defendants

Trial in the above-entitled matter came before the Court April
17, 18, and 19, 1990, and August 21, 22, 23, and 24, 1990.

An

evidentiary hearing dealing with the issues of attorney fees and
costs was held on December 31, 1991. At all times, Plaintiffs were
represented by James A. Mcintosh, Esq., and Irving H. Biele, Esq..
Defendant Eugene E. Doms was represented by Larry R. Keller, Esq.,
and Craig L. Boorman, Esq..

Third-Party Defendant, Summit County

Title Company, was represented by Brant H. Wall, Esq..

After

hearing the oral testimony of witnesses, reviewing such documentary
evidence

as was admitted, memoranda

filed by

counsel herein,

considering the oral argument of counsel, and good cause appearing,
the Court having heretofore on September 9, 1991, signed certain

"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" and "Judgment;" the
parties having filed certain motions to amend the said Findings,
Conclusions, and Judgment; the Court thereafter on May 6, 1992,
having signed certain documents entitled "Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law," "Amended Judgment," and heaving further
signed those certain documents entitled "Supplement to Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law," and "Supplement to Judgment;" which
supplemental documents pertain primarily to the issue of attorney
fees and Court costs; the Court desiring to consolidate the said
amended

and supplemental

pleadings; hereby

enters

its "Second

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" as follows:
SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs

in

this

case,

as

grantors,

conveyed

to

Defendant Eugene E. Doms and one Michael R. McCoy, pursuant to a
form Warranty deed upon which the word "Special" was typed, Lots
in Block 58 and 59, Park City Survey, State of Utah, and more
particularly described in Plaintiffs' Exhibit IP as follows:
PARCEL NO. 1:

All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58,
Park City Survey, according to the amended plat
thereof, as filed and of record in the office
of the Summit County Recorder.

PARCEL NO. 2:

All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof,
as filed and of record in the office of the
Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom
any portion located within the railroad rights
of way as described in those certain documents
recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page
401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326,
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373,
records of Summit County, Utah.

PARCEL NO. 3:

All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey,
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed
-3-
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and of record in the office of the Summit
County Recorder, excepting therefrom any
portion located within the railroad rights of
way as described in those certain documents
recorded as Entry No, 8176 in Book C at Page
4 01, Entry No. 13 316 in Book H at Page 326,
and Entry No. 13 610 in Book H at Page 373,
records of Summit County, Utah.
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and
water lines over the Southerly five feet and Northerly five
feet of the following described Lots.
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City
Survey according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of
record in the office of the Summit County Records.
The property so described shall be referred to hereafter as
the "Rossie Hills Property."
2.

The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase dated

November

12, 1981

(see Defendants

contract

for

sale

the

of

the

Exhibit

Rossie

63D) , is a valid

Hills

Property,

and

specifically states that the conveyance of said property is to be
by "Warranty Deed."
3.

All subsequent documents of sale involving the parties

in this action leading up to the transfer of the Rossie Hills
Property

by the

aforementioned

Warranty

Deed

referred

to the

documents of transfer as a "Warranty Deed."
4.

The aforementioned Warranty Deed, executed by all four

of the Plaintiffs in this matter as grantors did not have the word
"Special" typed at the top of the document at the time the grantors
executed said Deed nor was it on the Deed when said Deed was
delivered to Defendant Doms on March 23, 1982.
5.

Said Warranty Deed did not contain any of the language

which could lead the Court to the conclusion that it may have been
a "Special Warranty Deed," even if such were officially recognized
-4u ^ O ^J ( (

under Utah law.
6.

Said Warranty deed contained no exceptions or limiting

language with regard to certain encumbrances and easements which
shall be hereafter discussed in these Findings.
7.
McCoy

Access to the Rossie Hills Property at the'time Doms and

purchased

the

property

was

via

a

graded

right-of-way

extending in a northeasterly direction from the old rail right-ofway south of Block 59 as shown in Defendant's Exhibit 77D.
8.

After accessing the Rossie Hills property, the roadway

continued to Lot 21 of Block 58, made a loop through what was
designated as McHenry Avenue and Lots 24 and 25. This roadway will
hereafter be designated as the loop road.

(See Defendants Exhibit

77D.)
9.

The loop road which is approximately 10-15 feet wide has

been in use for in excess of 40 years.
10.

Said

loop

road

has

been

used

openly,

notoriously,

continuously, and adversely by the residents who reside on Ontario
Avenue and whose rear property borders, or intrudes upon the Rossie
Hills property, for a period in excess of 40 years as of the date
of March 23, 1982, the date of delivery of the Warranty Deed by
grantors to Defendant doms.

Such use was for ingress and egress

to the rear of their property, and for parking.
11.

Along the westerly boundaries of the lots in Block 58 are

encroachments such as sheds, fences and decks owned and used by
adjoining property owners to the west.
77D.)
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(See Defendants Exhibit

12.

The encroachments

protrude from

12-16

feet onto the

Rossie Hills Property.
13.
bordered

These
by

encroachments,

said

including

fences, had

been

used

the

backyard

openly,

areas

notoriously,

continuously and adversely for a period in excess of twenty years
as of March 23, 1982, by the aforementioned property owners, and
such use continues through present time.
14.

At the time of the delivery of the Deed to the Rossie

Hills Property, Plaintiffs had knowledge of the aforementioned
encroachments, either directly or through the knowledge of their
agent, Mike Sloan.
15.
aforesaid

Plaintiffs made no effort to remove or extinguish the
encumbrances

prior

to

the delivery

of the

Deed to

Defendant Doms, or at any time thereafter.
16.

Plaintiffs made no effort to quiet title to the Rossie

Hills Property and cause McHenry Avenue to be vacated; therefore,
Plaintiffs made no effort to mitigate Defendant's damages as such
damages related to these aforementioned encumbrances.
17.

The purchase price for the rossie Hills Property was the

amount of Two Hundred Seventy-Six Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($276,750.00).
18.

(See Defendant's Exhibit 69D.)

The Plaintiffs received the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars

($10,000.00) as earnest money in the aforementioned transaction,
and a down payment of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($72,500.00), leaving a balance due on the purchase price of One
Hundred

Ninety-Four

Thousand

Two

($194,250.00).
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Hundred

Fifty

Dollars

19.

In consideration for the transfer of the Rossie Hills

property by Warranty Deed, Defendant Doms and one Michael R. McCoy
executed a Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed dated March 10, 1982.
(See Plaintiffs' Exhibits 2P and 3P.) Said Trust Deed Note was in
the amount of One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two 'Hundred Fifty
Dollars (!$194,250.00) and called for interest payments monthly up
to and including January 10fl 985. The Note also provided that the
entire unpaid principal, together with interest, was due on January
25, 1985.
20.

The amount of each monthly payment was to be Two Thousand

Two Hundred Sixty-Six and 25/100 Dollars ($2,266.25).
21.

Said Trust Deed Note provided that "each payment shall

be applied

first to accrued

interest and the balance to the

reduction of principal."
22.

Plaintiffs received the sum of Seventy-Two Thousand Five

Hundred Twenty and 25/100 Dollars ($72,520.25) as monthly payments
pursuant to the aforementioned Trust Deed Note.

(See Plaintiffs1

Exhibit 6P.)
23.

The property conveyed to Eugene E. Doms and Michael R.

McCoy was located in a platted subdivision.
24.

The Rossie Hills Property as platted showed that the lots

in Block 58 and 59 were accessible by McHenry Avenue.

(See

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 99P.)
25.

The recorded plat of the Rossie Hills Property was not

a true reflection of the actual physical layout of the land because
of the contour and fact that McHenry Avenue was never constructed
as a roadway.
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26.

The Rossie Hills Property was purchased for residential

development.
27.

At the time the Rossie Hills property was purchased, it

was zoned HR-1, which allowed historical uses and allowed single,
duplex and tri-plex dwellings to be constructed upon'the property.
28.

The utilization of all of the Rossie Hills Property is

affected by the contour of the land, the loop road, encroachments
and McHenry Avenue being undeveloped.
29.

Plaintiffs1

appraiser, Mr. Pia, concluded that as of

March 10, 1982, the value of the Rossie Hills Property subject to
the loop road and encroachments was around Two Hundred

Fifty

Thousand Dollars ($250,000.00).
30.

Defendant Doms1 appraiser, Mr. Webber, concluded that as

of March 10, 1982, the value of the Rossie Hills property was One
Hundred

Sixty-Six

Thousand

Dollars

($166,000.00)

if

the

encumbrances and loop road can be relocated and One Hundred Ten
Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars ($110,700.00) if the loop road and
encumbrances cannot be relocated.
31.

McHenry Avenue had not been vacated by Park City or by

a judicial determination.
32.

Plaintiffs did not or could not have conveyed good and

marketable title to any part of McHenry Avenue at the time of the
execution of the warranty Deed to Doms and McCoy.
33.

Defendant Doms met with Mike Sloan, a real estate agent,

in the fall of 1981 to discuss the sale and purchase of the Rossie
Hills Property.
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34.

Defendant Doms also met with Dewey Anderson, one of the

sellers of the Rossie Hills Property, once before Doms and McCoy
purchased the property.
35.

Both Sloan and Anderson represented that the property was

a prime piece of development property and its highest and best use
would be as an integrated development with the two

adjoining

parcels referred to as Block 62 and the Slipper parcel.
36.

Defendant Doms and McCoy purchased an interest in the

Slipper parcel in October of 1982.
37.

The Slipper parcel was purchased by Doms and McCoy to

further the integrated development of the three parcels and to
equalize their position with the developers of the Slipper parcel
and Block 62.
38.

In October of 1982, Doms engaged Mr. Gerald H. Kinghorn,

an attorney, for the specific purpose of closing the purchase of
the Slipper parcel and continuing the negotiations with the owners
of Block 62 for the purpose of developing the three parcels as an
integrated development.
39.

Prior to Doms1 purchase of the rossie Hills Property,

Doms was shown a preliminary site plan for the development of the
three parcels of property prepared by the architect, Mr. Richard
Kohler.
40.
the

Doms knew or should have known at the time he purchased

Rossie

Hills

Property

and

the

Slipper

parcel

that

the

integrated development of the three parcels had failed because of
the problems with the Rossie Hills property and the inability of
the parties to reach an agreement as to credits for each parcel.
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41.

Doms walked the Rossie Hills property with Mr, Sloan in

the fall of 1981 and knew that there were roads and sheds on the
property.
42.

Mr. Sloan informed Defendant doms that the encroachments

would not affect development and an access road to* the property
would be in the same place as the loop road.
43.

Doms had actual notice of the easement encroachments for

the first time sometime between October 22, 1981, and November 7,
1981, and had further notice during 1982 and up and through 1984.
44.

Doms did not give notice of his intent to rescind until

January of 1985, and said notice was by way of a settlement offer
in lieu of making the One Hundred Ninety Four Thousand Two Hundred
Fifty Dollar ($194,250.00) payment due on January 25, 1985.

Said

settlement offer in January of 1985 was an offer made to Plaintiffs
through Defendant Doms1

attorney, Gerald H. Kinghom,

in which

Defendant Doms offered to deed back the property to Plaintiffs in
return for Plaintiffs1 cancellation of the aforementioned Trust
Deed Note.
45.

Plaintiffs did not respond to said settlement offer, but

rather filed a Complaint to foreclose on the property in June of
1985.
46.
develop

Doms1 purchase of Slipper parcel, the negotiations to
the

three

parcels

as

an

integrated

development,

the

subsequent negotiations about credits and defining the problems
with the Rossie Hills property, affirm the fact that Doms had
personal knowledge of the road and encroachments no later than
October of 1982.
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47.

It was not until Plaintiffs1 action to foreclose was

filed that Defendant Doms filed his Amended Counterclaim in June
of 1988 seeking to rescind the Warranty Deed.
48.

Defendant Doms failed to file his claim for damages

against the Estate of D.C. Anderson within three months after the
date of the first publication of Notice to Creditors as provided
in Section 75-3-803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code.
49.

The Original Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment signed

on September 9, 1991, were filed in the office of the Summit County
Clerk on October 22, 1991, which the court finds is the date of
Entry.
50.

The Original Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment were not

"final" because there were several issues to be decided which the
Court had not included in the said documents, which consisted of
several items including determination of attorney fees and costs.
51.

The Court does not believe it should interfere with the

agreements entered into by the client and the attorney for services
to be rendered when the attorneys, as in this case, have fully
apprised the clients of the fees and costs at the outset of the
case.
52.

The attorneys for plaintiffs and defendant have kept

detailed records of the time spent in the prosecution of this case
and have billed regularly so that the client was always aware of
what was transpiring in the case.
53.

The Court's decision as to fees and costs is not to be

construed as negating the clientfs obligation to pay the attorneys
in accordance with the terms of the attorney-client agreement.

C106384

54-

The Court finds that the "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer

to Purchase" which was signed by some of the parties in November
1981 was merged into the later Warranty Deed dated March 10, 1982.
Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co.. 598 P.2d 346 (Utah 1979).
(a)

The said Warranty Deed did not provide for payment

of attorney fees in an action based upon breach of warranties
contained in the said Deed.
55.

The Court finds that purchasers of real estate are not

entitled to attorney fees absent an express agreement providing
therefore, unless the purchaser commences a separate action against
third parties to remove encumbrances.

George A. Lowe Co. v.

Simmons Warehouse Co., 39 Utah 395, 117 Pac. 874 (1911).
(a)

Doms has not commenced a separate action against

third parties to remove encumbrances.
56.

The Court finds the plaintiffs1 complaint in foreclosure

as well as all other actions by the plaintiffs were not instituted
or prosecuted in bad faith.
57.

The Counsel for plaintiffs and Doms aggressively and

zealously presented their cases and neither party acted in bad
faith.
58.

The Court finds that Doms is not entitled to attorney

59.

The defendant Doms is not entitled to any prejudgment

fees.

interest on the $83,000.00 damages.
60.

Doms

is

entitled

to

the

following

costs

for

the

prosecution of his Second Amended Counterclaim:
(a)

Service of process on Jeanne Scott

$ 12.00

(b)

Service of process on Ellen Anderson

$ 12.75
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61.

(c)

Service of trial subpoena: Mike Sloan

$ 24.75

(d)

Witness fees: Elden and Ella Sorensen

$ 34.00

(e)

Recording fee for corrected Sheriff's
Deed

$ 18.00

(f)

The said costs awarded to Doms total*

$101.50

The issue of plaintiffs being entitled to attorney fees

and costs can be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs because the
provisions contained in the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed provided
that all costs and expenses of collection including reasonable
attorney fees can be charged against the maker.
62.

The Court finds that counsel for the plaintiffs and

defendant have expended many hours in the prosecution of this case
and their time sheets so reflect.
63.

The Court finds that hourly rates charged by counsel for

plaintiffs and defendant were reasonable.
64.

The

Court

finds that

Plaintiffs1

counsel, James A.

Mcintosh, at page 12 of his affidavit dated December 6, 1991,
states, "Most of the services rendered were in connection with the
Second Amended Counterclaim."
(a)

The time spent

on collection

of the Note and

foreclosure action by plaintiffs1 counsel was nominal in comparison
to all the hours expended in this case.
(b)

The Court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to

recover attorney fees for the time spent on the collection of the
Trust Deed Note and the Trust Deed foreclosure action but not for
any time spent in defending against any of the causes of action in
the Second Amended Counterclaim.
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65.
fees

for

The Court finds the plaintiffs are entitled to attorney
legal

services

incurred

in

the

prosecution

of

the

collection of the Note foreclosure action, the motion to set aside
default,

to

compel

sanctions,

setting

aside

the

tax

sale,

intermediate appeal and petition for extraordinary writ to the Utah
Supreme Court.
66-

In addressing the issue of these fees, the Court will

take into consideration the effect of the attorney fees awarded the
plaintiffs by Judge Pat B. Brian in the amount of $4,467.60 as a
condition of setting aside the Default Judgment against Doms.
67.

The Court will also make an award to plaintiffs based

upon Judge J.

Dennis Frederick's

ruling that plaintiffs were

entitled to a reasonable fee for bringing a motion to compel and
for sanctions before the court.
68.

The criteria for the Courtfs decision awarding attorney

fees is set forth in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985
(Utah 1988).
69.

The Court understands the amount in controversy can be

a factor in determining a reasonable fee, but the Court is not
putting much reliance on this factor.
70.

The Court finds the plaintiffs should be awarded attorney

fees as follows:
(a)

FOR PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL, JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ,:
(i)

Lawsuit to set aside tax sale

$ 5,245.00

(ii)

Petition for intermediate appeal

$ 2,7 3 0.00

(iii) Petition for extraordinary writ

$ 2,160.00

(iv)

For the foreclosure complaint

$12,300.00

(v)

For the motion to compel and for
-14-
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sanctions as per Judge Frederick's
minute entries
$ 4,750.00
(vi)
(b)

The total amount to be awarded for
Mr. Mcintosh's fees is
$27,185.00

FOR PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL IRVING H. BIELE, ESQ.:
(i)

Motion to set aside default
(This amount has already been
paid by Doms)

$ 4,467.00

(ii)

Lawsuit to set aside tax sale

$ 1,050.00

(iii) Petition for extraordinary writ

(iv)

and mandamus

$ 2,740.00

For the foreclosure complaint

$10,000.00

(v)

71.

The total amount to be awarded
for Mr. Biele's fees is
$13,790.00
The Court finds the plaintiffs are entitled to the

following costs:
(a)

Summit County Cleric —

(b)

Richie Zabriskie —

filing Complaint $ 50.00

fee for service

of Third-Party Summons and Complaint
(c)

Summit County Clerk —

filing fee for

Complaint in Civil No. 10066
(d)

Richie Zabriskie —

$ 16.50

$ 75.00

fee for service

of process in Civil No. 10066 on Domcoy
Enterprises Inc.
(e)

Utah Supreme Court —

$ 2 4.70
docketing fee

for filing Petition for Intermediate
Appeal
(f)

$12 5.00

Utah Supreme Court —

filing fee for

Petition for Extraordinary Writ of
Prohibition

$ 50.00
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(g)

Summit County Clerk —

fee for

certification of order
(h)

Steve Deckert —

$

witness fee for

attending trial
(i)

LeRoy J. Pia —

$ 30-00
witness fee

to attend trial
(j)

$ 50.00

The total amount of the said costs
to be awarded to the plaintiffs is

72.

3.50

$358.20

The Trust Deed Note dated March 10, 1982, provides for

payment of interest in the amount of fourteen percent (14%) per
annum prior to default, eighteen percent (18%) per annum after
default.
SECOND AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Deed which transferred the Rossie Hills property was

a Warranty Deed under Utah law and conveyed with it all of the
statutory warranties and covenants contained in U.C.A. Section 571-12.
2.
said

The loop road, sheds, fences, backyard areas bordered by

fences,

and

decks

are

encroachments

and

constitute

encumbrances upon the property.
3.

Said encumbrances existed on the Rossie Hills property

on the date of the delivery of the Deed, which was March 23, 1982.
4.

Said encumbrances constitute a breach of the statutory

covenants contained in the Warranty Deed pursuant to U.C.A. Section
57-1-12.
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5.

The

aforesaid

statutory

covenants

contained

in

the

Warranty Deed were breached upon the delivery of the Warranty Deed
to Defendant Doms on March 23, 1982.
6.

The

Warranty

Deed, Trust

Deed

Note

and

Trust

Deed

prepared at the same time do not constitute a single contract.
7.
is:

The Court believes that the law applicable to this case

The acceptance of the Deed completes the execution of the

contract, and the Deed become final and conclusive evidence of the
contract under which it is executed (84 A.L.R. 1009).
8.

The Court concludes that the Utah case of Reese Howell

Company v. Brown. 48 Utah 142, 158 P. 684, 689 (1916), sets forth
the controlling law which must be applied in the instant case
regarding the issue as to whether or not the Warranty Deed, Note
and Trust Deed constitutes a single contract.
9.

The fact that a Trust Deed and Note were executed at the

same time does not make them part of the contract to purchase the
property. The Trust Deed and Note are documents executed to secure
the payment of the property, and have no bearing upon whether the
property is free and clear of encumbrances.
10.

Defendant Doms1 remedy in this case is for a breach of

the statutory covenants of warranty.
11.

The utilization of the Rossie Hills Property is adversely

affected by the encroachments and loop road to the extent that the
value of the property is diminished.
12.

Defendant Doms has been damaged by virtue of Plaintiffs1

breach.
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13.

Defendant Domsf damages should be measured as of the date

of the breach, which is March 23, 1982, the date of the delivery
of the Deed.
14.

Said

damages

should

be

measured

with

all

of

the

encumbrances in place and as they existed on March 23, 1982.
15.

The proper measure of damages under Utah law is the

difference in the value of the property without any encumbrances
minus the value of the property with the encumbrances.
16.

The loop road does have a beneficial value for the

development of the Rossie Hills Property.
17.

Under

Utah

law,

it

was

the

Plaintiffs1

burden

and

obligation to mitigate the damages suffered by Defendant doms
because

Plaintiffs were

in breach

of the

statutory

covenants

contained in the Deed at the time the Deed was delivered.
18.

Plaintiffs had the obligation of quieting title to the

Rossie Hills property and causing McHenry Avenue to be vacated; and
if Plaintiffs had done so, Defendant Doms1 damages would have been
mitigated.
19.

As a result of the encumbrances existing on the Rossie

Hills Property on March 23, 1982, Defendant Doms has suffered
damages in the sum of Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars ($83,000.00).
20.
Hundred

Defendant Doms is entitled to an offset against the Two
Seventy=Six

Thousand

Seven

Hundred

Fifty

Dollars

($276,750.00) purchase price of the property, in the amount of
Eighty-Two

Thousand

Five

Hundred

Dollars

represents

the earnest money payment

($82,500.00),

of Ten Thousand

which

Dollars

($10,000.00) and the down payment of Seventy-Two Thousand Five
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Hundred Dollars ($72,500.00).
21.

The remaining balance due after said offset of Eighty-

Two Thousand

Five Hundred Dollars

($82,500.00) is One Hundred

Ninety-Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00), which
represents the principal balance of the Trust Deed Note as of the
date of the execution of said Note and the Trust Deed.
22.
offset

Defendant
of

Doms is further entitled to an additional

Eighty-Three

Thousand

Dollars

($83,000.00),

which

represents the damages suffered by Defendant Doms as a result of
the encumbrances on the property as set forth above.
23.

Therefore, the remaining unpaid balance under the Trust

Deed Note and Trust Deed was One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($111,250.00) as of March 23, 1982, the date
of the delivery of the Warranty Deed.
24.

From April 0, 1982 through January 10, 1985, monthly

interest payments under the Trust Deed Note were received by
Plaintiffs on an unpaid principal balance of One Hundred NinetyFour Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00), rather than
One

Hundred

Eleven

Thousand

Two

Hundred

Fifty

Dollars

($111,250.00), which the court has concluded was the unpaid balance
due under the Trust Deed Note at that time.
25.

under the terms of the Trust Deed Note, the amount

actually due in monthly interest payments on the un paid principal
balance of one Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars
(111,250.00) was Forty-One Thousand Five Hundred Thirty-Three and
44/100 Dollars

($41,533.44).
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26.

Since Plaintiffs received monthly interest payments in

the amount of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Twenty and 25/100
Dollars

($72,520,25), Defendant Doms is further entitled to an

additional off-set of Thirty Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-Six and
81/100

Dollars

($30,986.81),

which

represents

the

difference

between the interest paid on One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two
Hundred Fifty Dollars

($194,250.00) and the interest which was

actually due on One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($111,250.00) for the same period.
27.

Therefore, the remaining unpaid principal balance due

under the Trust Deed Note is Eighty Thousand Two Hundred SixtyThree and 19/100 Dollars ($80,263.19), as of January 25, 1985, the
date said principal amount was due under the terms of the Trust
Deed Note.
28.

Inasmuch as Defendant Doms1 damages were not determined

and a Judgment has not been entered for said damages, Plaintiffs1
action for a judgment of foreclosure is premature.
29.

Without

the

necessity

of

refiling

this

action

to

foreclose the Trust Deed, the Court will require Plaintiffs to give
Defendant Doms a Notice of Default and Defendant Doms shall have
the right to pay the entire amount due under the terms of the Trust
Deed Note and Trust Deed, together with costs and attorney fees,
as determined ny the Court, within 90 days from receipt of the
Notice of Default.

The giving of the Notice of Default shall not

take place until after the Judgment is entered and notice can be
served on Defendant Doms and/or his attorney.

Service on the

Defendant Doms may be made by mailing the said notice to the
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Defendant's last known address.
30.

The Court recognizes that there are two options by which

to foreclose a note and trust deed, administratively or judicially.
Due to the circumstances in this case, the failure of Plaintiffs
to ascertain damages prior to proceeding with the foreclosure
action, Defendant Doms should be given 90 days' notice to satisfy
the Note before Plaintiffs can proceed with the foreclosure action.
31.

Plaintiffs are entitled to interest on the unpaid balance

of Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Three and 19/100 Dollars
($80,263.19) from January 25, 1985, the date the unpaid principal
balance was due under the terms of the Trust Deed Note.

The

interest rate to be used in determining the amount due Plaintiffs
as interest on said unpaid principal balance shall be fourteen
percent (14%) per annum.
32.

If Defendant Doms fails to pay the balance due and owing

after notice, Plaintiffs shall have Judgment of foreclosure upon
filing an affidavit that Defendant Doms has failed to pay.

The

Plaintiffs will have the sole option at their discretion to a
Judgment

of

foreclosure

based

either

on

the

administrative

foreclosure proceedings set forth in Sections 57-1-23 et. seq. ,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, or the judicial foreclosure
proceedings provided in Sections 78-37-1 et. seg..
33.

In regard to the issue of whether or not Defendant Doms

was entitled to rescind the contract, the Court concludes that
Defendant Doms was bound to take remedial action after the Fall of
1981 which the Court determined to be the date he was made aware
of the encroachments and loop road, and which was prior to the
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purchase of the Slipper parcel.
34.

It was not necessary for Defendant Doms to obtain a legal

opinion that the loop road was a prescriptive easement or that the
shed and fences had a legal basis for being on the Rossie Hills
Property before he could make his tender to rescind..
35.

Once

Defendant

Doms

knew

of

the

road

and

the

encumbrances, he should have taken action within a reasonable time
to notify the sellers of his intent to rescind the transaction.
36.

The Court concludes that the case of Eaeter v. West and

North Properties, 758 P.2d 361 (Ore. App. 1988), is not applicable
to this case in that Eaeter stands for the proposition, among
others, that an unmaintained dirt road that showed little use and
brush and trees had to be removed to drive on it was not so open
or notorious that purchasers would be chargeable with knowledge of
its existence.
37.

Eaeter is readily distinguishable from the facts of the

instant case because there is not question that the road in this
case has been used and was being used.
38.

The Eaeter case is applicable to the instant case in the

sense that it stands for the proposition that the person seeking
to

rescind

the

contract must

do

so promptly

after

obtaining

knowledge of the facts constituting the grounds for rescind so long
as he acts within a reasonable time.
39.

Defendant Doms did not act within a reasonable time after

he obtained knowledge that the loop road and the encroachments were
upon the Rossie Hills Property.
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40.

The

Court

unreasonable

concludes

amount

of

time

that
to

Defendant

seek

Doms

rescission;

waited

an

therefore,

rescission is not the appropriate remedy in this case and is barred
by the doctrine of laches.
41.
the

Defendant Doms presented insufficient evidence to carry

burden

of

proof

that

Plaintiffs

committed

fraud

and

misrepresentation in this matter.
42.

With

regard

to

Civil

No.

10066,

and

Count

I

of

Plaintiffs1 Complaint contained therein, pursuant to Stipulation
of the parties and a previous Order of the court, the May 27, 1987,
Tax Sale of the Rossie Hills Property by Summit County should be
declared to be null and void.
43.

The foregoing Conclusion of Law shall be deemed not to

affect the Trust Deed dated March 10, 1982, in any adverse manner
by the said tax sale. The rights, title, liens and interest of the
Plaintiffs and Defendant Eugene E. Doms and Domcoy Enterprises,
Inc. , a Utah corporation, shall not be deemed to be affected by the
said tax sale.

The Court's previous Order invalidating the tax

sale does not in and of itself either validate or invalidate any
subsequent deeds issued regarding the Rossie Hill Property.
44.

The Warranty Deed dated August 26, 1988, in which Domcoy

Enterprises, Inc., as grantor, conveyed the Rossie Hills Property
to Defendant Doms, as grantee, is a valid Deed which transferred
legal title to Defendant Doms.
45.

In regard to Count II of Plaintiffs1 Complaint in Civil

No. 10066, title to the Rossie Hills Property should be quieted in
Defendant

Doms,

subject to Plaintiffs1
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right to

foreclose as

previously set forth in these Conclusions of Law,
46.

In regard to Count III of Plaintiffs1 Complaint in Civil

NO, 10066, said Count III has been previously dismissed by the
Court on Motion of Summit County.
47.

In regard to Plaintiffs1 Third-Party Complaint against

Third-Party Defendant Summit County Title Company in Civil No.
8 3 39, said Third-Party Complaint has been previously dismissed by
the Court on Motion of said parties.
48.

Defendant

doms1

Second

Amended

Counterclaim

seeking

damages against Plaintiff Ellen Anderson as Personal Representative
of the Estate of D.C. Anderson is barred by the three-month filing
period limitation for claims against an estate pursuant to Section
75-3-803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, as said section relates
to the issues of damages.
49.

This Court has In personam

jurisdiction over Plaintiff

Jeanne Scott pursuant to a ruling by the Utah Supreme

Court

contained in an Amended Minute Entry denying Plaintiffs' Petition
for an Extraordinary Writ under Rule 65B(B)4, Supreme Court Case
No. 890269. In said Amended Minute Entry, dated July 31, 1989, the
Utah Supreme Court denied said Petition for an Extraordinary Writ,
and ruled that this Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff Jeanne
Scott because she was a grantor on the Warranty Deed, and is a
proper party to Defendant Domsf Second Amended Counterclaim under
Rules 13 and 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
50.

Plaintiffs1 remaining objections to the Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment dated September 9, 1991, are
denied.
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51.

The

plaintiffs

should

be

awarded

attorney

fees

of

$27,185.00 for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, James A.
Mcintosh, Esq.
52.

The

plaintiffs

should

be

awarded

attorney

fees

of

$13,790.00 for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, Irving H.
Biele, Esq.
53.

The plaintiffs should be awarded $358.20 for costs which

they have incurred in these proceedings.
54.
percent

The plaintiffs should be awarded interest of fourteen
(14%) per annum on all principal amounts the court has

determined were due and owing on the Trust Deed Note dated March
10, 1982, both before and after default.
55.

The defendant Doms should not be awarded any attorney

fees for services rendered by his counsel in either Civil No. 83 39
or Civil No. 10066.
56.
interest

The defendant Doms should not be awarded any prejudgment
on the

$83,000.00 damages described

in the original

Judgment dated September 9, 1991.
57.

The defendant Doms should be awarded $101.50 for costs

for prosecution of the Second Amended Counterclaim.
DATED this

/£ day of June 1992.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE JOHN
-B-i'strict Court

X£\ COUNTY /^i
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of May, 1992, a true
and correct copy of the above and foregoing SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand delivered to the following:
Larry R. Keller, Esq.
257 East 200 South, Suite 340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

JAMES A- MCINTOSH
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MOV 0 4 3 t

00O00

Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court

Ellen Anderson, as personal representative of the Estate of D.C. Anderson;
Ellen Anderson, personally; Dan Scott
and Jeanne Scott,
Plaintiffs, Appellants, and
Cross-Appellees,
v.
Michael R. McCoy; and Eugene E. Poms,
Defendant, Appellee, and
Cross-Appellant,

MEMORANDUM
DECISION
(Not For
Publication)
Case No. 920653-CA
F I L E D
(November 4, 1994)

Ellen Anderson, as personal representative of the Estate of D.C. Anderson;
Ellen Anderson, personally; Dan Scott
and Jeanne Scott,
Third-Party Plaintiffs, Appellants,
and Cross-Appellees,
v.
Summit County Title Company, a Utah
corporation,
Third-Party Defendants, and
Appellees,
Ellen Anderson, as personal representative of the Estate of D.C. Anderson;
Ellen Anderson, personally; Dan Scott
and Jeanne Scott,
Plaintiffs, Appellants, and
Cross-Appellees,
v.
Summit County, a body corporate and
politic of the State of Utah; and Blake
L. Frazier, in his official capacity as
Summit County Auditor; Gump & Ayers Real
Estate, Inc., a Utah corporation; Victor
R. Ayres; Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., a
Utah corporation; Eugene E. Poms;
unknown defendants described as John
Does 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5,
Defendants, Appellees, and
Cross-Appellant.

Third District, Summit County
The Honorable John A. Rokich
Attorneys:

Irving H. Biele and Curtis C. Nesset, Salt Lake City,
for Appellant
Larry R. Keller and Craig L. Boorman, Salt Lake City,
for Cross-Appellant Eugene Doms

Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Jackson.
JACKSON, Judge:
Appellants raise several challenges to the trial court's
determination to allow appellee (Doms) to proceed with his
counterclaim. Appellants' arguments relating to the counterclaim
include whether the statute of limitations barred the
counterclaim, whether the counterclaim related back to the date
appellants filed their foreclosure action, whether the deed Doms
obtained from Domcoy was valid, whether Doms was the real party
in interest, whether Doms was a remote grantee, and whether the
trial court improperly joined involuntary plaintiffs. We agree
with the trial court's decision to allow Doms to proceed with his
counterclaim and find appellants' arguments to be without merit.
Thus, we decline to address them. See State v. Carter. 776 P.2d
886, 896 (Utah 1989) (court may decline to address arguments
without merit on appeal).
In his cross-appeal, Doms asserts that the trial court
improperly applied the equitable doctrine of laches and refused
to rescind the Rossi Hills transaction. "To successfully assert
a laches defense, a defendant must establish both that the
plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an action and that the
defendant was prejudiced by that delay." Borland v. Chandler,
733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987); accord Papanikolas Brothers Enter,
v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assocs.. 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah
1975) ; Utah Deot. of Transp. v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,
751 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1988) (defendant must establish
prejudice before laches defense may be successfully asserted);
see In re Petition of Merrill Cook, 249 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah
1994) (denying petition because petitioners failed to act with
reasonable diligence and because relief requested "could work a
substantial hardship on the State").
The trial court made findings concerning Doms's delay in
bringing the action but made no findings as to whether appellants
were prejudiced by the delay.1 Therefore, we remand this case to
1. W«a note that we do not agree that any time property increases
:r decreases in value, the prejudice prong of the laches defense
is automatically met. See Child v. Child, 332 P.2d 981, 988
(Utah 1958) ("natural increment" in value of property does not
constitute prejudice in laches claim); see also West Los Angeles
Institute for Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 228 (9th
Cir. 1966) (mere increase or decrease in property value does not
(continued...)
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the trial court for the purpose of entering findings of fact
relevant to whether appellants were prejudiced by any delays in
Doms pursuing his counterclaim. If the trial court cannot find
from the evidence presented that the appellants were prejudiced
by the delay, the equitable doctrine of laches should not bar the
remedy of rescission.2 Accordingly, we remand this case to the
trial court.

Nor^kn H. Jackson

WE CONCUR:

Cftidith M. B i l l i n g s ,

Judge*

5enwondJ1 Jud
reenwoodT
Judge

1. (...continued)
alone convert delay into laches); Fitzgerald v. O'Connell, 386
A.2d 1384, 1388 (R.I. 1978); (fact that property appreciated does
not in and of itself convert delay into laches); Lincoln v.
Fisher, 339 P.2d 1084, 1098 (Or. 1959).
A change in property value is one factor courts should
consider in determining prejudice. Lawson v. Hanves, 170 F.2d
741, 744 (10th Cir. 1948); Filler v. Richland County. 806 P.2d
537, 540 (Mont. 1991); Jacobson v. Jacobson. 557 P.2d 156, 159
(Utah 197 6). Further, other courts have determined that a change
in property value did not prejudice landowners because the change
could be taken into account by a court of equity in fashioning a
just remedy. Small v. Badenhop. 701 P.2d 647, 658 (Haw. 1985).
2. Because it is possible that the trial court will order the
contract rescinded due to lack of evidence in the record
concerning prejudice, we need not address the other claims
raised. However, in the event the trial court does not rescind
the transaction, the trial court should note that its findings
and conclusions do not adequately treat the effect of the
intervening conveyances to and from Domcoy on Doms's right to
pursue his counterclaims and the effect of the default judgment
entered against McCoy and the sheriff's sale of McCoy's interest
in Rossi Hills on Doms's ownership interest in the property and
any damages for breach of title warranties.
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LARRY R. KELLER, #1785
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant Eugene E. Doms
525 East 100 South, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo—
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal
Representative of the Estate
MODIFIED JUDGMENT
of D.C. ANDERSON, DAN SCOTT,
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally,
and JEANNE SCOTT,
:
Plaintiffs,

:

vs.
MICHAEL R. MCCOY AND
EUGENE E. DOMS,

:

Defendants.

ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal,
Representative of the Estate
of DC. ANDERSON, DAN SCOTT,
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally,
and JEANNE SCOTT,

Civil No. 8339
:
:

Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Third Party Defendant.

:
;

f

ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal
representative of the Estate of
D,C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee,

:

Plaintiffs,
v.
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZDBR, in his
official capacity as Summit
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah
corporation; VICTOR R AYERS;
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a
Utah corporation; EUGENE E.
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, 2,
3, 4, and 5,

Civil No. 10066

;

:
;

Defendants.
ooOoo

—

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on June 29, 2000 on Defendant Doms'
Motion to Enter Judgment on the June 24, 1999 Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals with Irving
H. Biele, Esq. present and representing Plaintiffs and Larry R. Keller, Esq. present and representing
Defendant Eugene E. Doras.
This Court finds and determines that despite the efforts on the part of Plaintiffs to continue to
axgue matters conclusively decided in the June 24, 1999 Decision of the Utah Coin! of Appeals, and
upheld by the Utah Supreme Court when it denied Certiorari in this matter, Judgment according to
the Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals should be entered as follows:
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1.

Recission as ordered by the Court of Appeals is the appropriate remedy in this matter,

2.

Defendant Eugene E. Doms has been determined by the Utah Court of Appeals to be
M y entitled to all amounts paid under the contract upon its recission, and this Court
declines to rule differently than the UtaJh Court of Appeals on that point since that
Court found Doms to be entitled to a refund of monies paid as one of the original
buyers of the property, and as the successor in interest to McCoy and DomCoy.

3.

Doms shall tender back to Plaintiffs all right, title and interest to the property subject
to his receiving the following sums:
a.

$10,000,00 earnest money at 10% interest from the date of payment which
shall be the sum of $28,731.5] through August 1, 2000 and $2.74 per day
thereafter;

b.

The sum of $72,500,00 constituting the down payment at 10% simple interest
which shall be the sum of $205,959.59 through August 1, 2000 and $19.86
per day thereafter;

c.

All payments made for taxes on the property at 10% interestfromthe date the
payment was made which shall be the sum of $23,070.73 through August 1,
2000 and $4.26 per day thereafter.

4.

Payments made pursuant to the Trust Deed Note which were interest payments shall
not be recoverable by Defendant Doms. It is the Court's opinion that had the money
been borrowed from any other party, Defendant Doms would have had to repay it
The Court cannot see a legal basis for allowing this interest on the Trust Deed Note
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to be returned to Defendant Doms and so the interest payments shall not be recovered
by Doms.
5.

The Court of Appeals has directed this Court to reduce the Judgment by fair rental
value; however the Courtfindsthat the record is completely devoid of any basis for
rental value for this raw ground which had never been used in any way by Defendant
Doms. Therefore the Court declines to reduce the Judgment in this case by any rental
value, finding there is no fair rental value to be placed upon the property.

6.

The Court chooses not to revisit the attorney's fees issue as such fees were necessary
to set aside the Default Judgment in this case; therefore no award is made for
recovery of said attorney's fees by Defendant Doms.

7.

This Courtfindsthat there has been an unwillingness on thepgiLaf^
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, and^khSugh the Court does not believe that
Plaintiffs7 counsel has intenJieriaOy attempted to mislead it, there clearly has been a

^S8.

breach of Rule>Kvith regard to arguments made by counsel and the sum of $500.00
j^s^arded as attorney's fees to Defendant Doms.
All amounts awarded here shall bear judgment at the legal post-judgment interest rate
from the date this Judgment is entered.
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DATED this 7 '

A

day of
BY THE COURT:

KdBEKT HlLDER
District Court Judge
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